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The Court of Appeals Review is a composite effort of the
entire staff of the Kentucky Law Journal. This, the second annual
edition, is the result of long hours and much effort in furtherance
of our policy of service to the Kentucky practitioner and assist-
ance to legal scholars throughout the nation. The subject matter
is the 1963-1964 term of the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The
cases are categorized and analyzed in relation to the previous law
in the particular field. The purpose of this effort is to draw upon
the talents of a staff of dedicated law students to compile and
consolidate the product of a full term of the court for the purpose
of providing our readers with a ready readable reference work.
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PUBLIC OFFICIALS
A. MuNIciPAL COROPRATIONS
Although the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided several cases
concerning municipal corporations during the last term, most of
these involved specific municipal ordinances or state statutes
governing the various classes of cities. Therefore, these decisions
were limited, for the most part, to statutory construction and
interpretation.
1. Annexation
In the first case concerning annexation that the Court of
Appeals decided during the last term, City of St. Matthews v.
City of Beechwood Village,1 an interesting question was pre-
sented. In this declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff city
(Beechwood Village) sought an adjudication that a three acre
tract of land had been annexed by it. The plaintiff enacted an
ordinance proposing annexation of the property in question.
However, the description in the ordinance was so inaccurate that
it did not encompass the territory proposed to be annexed. Never-
theless, the owners of the property to be annexed did not raise
any question concerning the deficient description in their remon-
strance suit objecting to the annexation ordinance. Subsequently,
a compromise was effected, and a judgment entered that the
plaintiff city could annex a part of the property. Later, defendant
city (St. Matthews) annexed a large area of territory to the legal
boundaries of the plaintiff city, including the property previously
annexed by plaintiff. The circuit court found that the annexation
proceedings by plaintiff were invalid, but nevertheless adjudged
that the owners of the property were estopped to challenge those
proceedings, and since defendant city annexed only to the legal
line of plaintiff city, which line included the property in question,
the defendant had not annexed the territory. The owners of the
property and the defendant city appealed. The Court of Appeals
reaffirmed the doctrine that a city cannot annex property through
the medium of estoppel, since this violates the legislative scheme
by which annexation may and should be accomplished. The court
stated that even if the lower court were correct in holding the
1 873 S.W.2d 427 (Ky. 1963).
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estoppel doctrine may be invoked against the property owners, it
cannot be extended to create legal rights against an unassociated
third party (defendant city) or against the public. Therefore,
plaintiff did not annex this territory, and since defendant annexed
to plaintiffs original boundary line, the property in question is
part of defendant city.
In Taustine v. Fleig,2 the court restated the existing law that
an appeal from the circuit court in an annexation proceeding by
the remonstrants, does not stay the annexing city's jurisdiction
over the annexed territory. The court held that a city, which is
the victor in remonstrance legislation to an annexation proceeding
in the circuit court, is free to proceed with annexation regardless
of remonstrants appeal thereto. The fact that the appeal is
pending at the time of the arrest of appellee for a crime assertedly
committed in the territory so annexed, does not deprive the police
judge of the annexing city of jurisdiction to dispose of the charge.
The Court of Appeals, in McClelan v. Central City,3 affirmed
the circuit court, and restated the general rule that there must
be a substantial excess of burdens over benefits to the proposed
annexed territory in order to defeat annexation. In this case, a
majority of the resident voters in the territory to be annexed
remonstrated against annexation. The court said that although
the city has the burden of proving that annexation will not
materially injure the landowners of an area to be annexed, a
showing of substantial benefits amounts to a negation of material
injury which shifts to the remonstrants the burden of proving a
"clear and obvious imposition of manifest and substantial bur-
dens,"as required by KRS 81.220.
In the case of Voorhes v. City of Lexington,4 a number of
contentions were raised by remonstrants in seeking a reversal of
the circuit court's decision against them. To the appelant's con-
tention that the ordinance proposing annexation by the city was
void because it was one of eighteen such annexation ordinances
adopted on the same day, the court held that each ordinance
encompassed one unit area, and this procedure did not split the
area to be annexed. In addition, the court reaffirmed the existing
2 374 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1964).
3 375 S.W.2d 823 (Ky. 1964).
4 377 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1964).
[Vol. 53,
COURT OF APPEALS l{EviEw
rule that an ordinance in annexing territory is not repealed by
implication when the city passes a subsequent ordinance propos-
ing annexation of parts of the same territory as encompassed in
the prior ordinance.
The appellants further contended that more than fifty percent
of the property owners remonstrated against annexation, and
therefore, the burden of proof was upon the city as provided by
K.RS 81.110. However, the court averted to the long standing
principle that the tax cards of the deputy county tax commissioner
and the records of patrons of the city water company were
properly admissible into evidence as public documents, and were
sufficient to raise a prima facie case in ascertaining the total
number of residents in the area in order to determine if fifty
percent of them have remonstrated. The testimony of the garbage
man in the area as to the total number of residents was insufficient
to overcome the prima facie case.
In addition, the lower court's finding that the annexation
would be for the interests of the city as required by KRS 81.110(2)
was not erroneous as contended by appellants, since the evidence
on neither side was so convincing as to preclude another con-
clusion, and therefore, the evidence supported the finding that
the proposed annexation is "for the interests of the city." Also the
court restated the existing law that although the responsibilities
of the city citizenship are a burden to the annexed territory, they
are not a decisive factor in determining whether proposed
annexation will produce manifest injury to resident freeholders
of the area sought to be annexed.
In the final case on annexation decided during the last term,
City of Hickman, Inc. v. Choate,5 the court stated that the policy
of the law is toward encouragement of municipal expansion and
against a fine weighing of relative benefits and burdens of
annexation. This is a slight modification of the general rule.
Accordingly, where the residents of the area adjoining the city
would not have had water and gas service except for the
instrumentality of the city, as in this case, they could not defeat
annexation by the city unless it was so unfair to them as to border
upon arbitrariness. In this case fifty percent of the residents
remonstrated thus throwing the burden on the city to show a
G 879 S.W.2d 288 (Ky. 1964).
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prima facie case of benefit to itself and to the property proposed
to be annexed. But the court stated that once this has been shown
by the city, the burden shifts to the property owners to prove
material injury. This is not shown merely by the fact that several
residents in the area might not be able to keep farm animals, or
that a stockyard in the territory might be closed.
2. Ordinances
In the only case decided concerning the adoption of a munici-
pal ordinance, City of Mt. Vernon v. Banks,' the Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court and reaffirmed the existing test that a
municipality may adopt any ordinance as long as it does not
abuse its discretion. The court held that a city, which is unable
to provide improvements reasonably appearing necessary to its
water system by means of rates in existence from the time the
water system was built about 1937, does not abuse its discretion
in raising the rates in the absence of showing that the increased
rates were confiscatory, unduly burdensome, discriminatory, eco-
nomically unsound or unreasonable.
8. Housing Commissions
In the first of two cases decided during the last term pertain-
ing to housing commissions, Marcum v. City of Louisville Mu-
nicipal Housing Commi'n,7 the Court of Appeals was called on to
decide whether the Louisville Municipal Housing Commission
was exempt from the Kentucky sales and use taxes. The court
held that the commission, as an institution of purely public
charity, was exempted from the Kentucky use tax statutes (KRS
139.310, 139.340, 139.470) on utilities purchased by it. However,
after following the existing statutory interpretation of the Ken-
tucky sales tax statutes (KRS 139.200, 139.210, 139.470), and the
cases construing such, the court concluded that in view of the
fact that the sales tax was a tax on the retailer and not upon the
purchaser, the commission was exempted from it, even though the
economic burden would be borne by the housing commission as a
purchaser.
The second such case, Norrell v. Judd,' decided a procedural
63 80 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1964).
7 374 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1963).
8 374 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1963).
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question, but contained important dictum. A taxpayer brought
an action to void a television service agreement between a private
non-profit corporation and the Frankfort Municipal Housing
Conmmission. The taxpayer had standing to challenge the validity
of the agreement on the theory of violation of the conflict of
interest statute. The acting director of the housing commission
was also director of the corporation, and was paid a fixed fee
therefore. The court held that when affidavits raised the fact
question of whether there was a conflict of interest under KRS
80.080, prohibiting such for members or employees of a housing
conmission, a summary judgment was precluded. However, the
court went further and stated that if there was a direct or indirect
interest in the agreement in question by the director, it would be
void. The court followed existing case law on this point.
4. Police
Two cases were decided by the Court of Appeals during the
last term concerning actions brought by police officers.
In City of Pikeville v. May,9 a police officer, who was hired
by the city council but never permitted to assume his duties, sued
to recover salary due from the city. The court, construing KRS
95.700 which permits a city operated police department and
provides that members of such department shall be subject to
removal for cause, held that this did not entitle the city council
to capriciously and without cause refuse to permit a qualified man
to serve after he had been duly appointed. This case is a restate-
ment of the existing law.
An action by a member of the police department of the city of
Covington against the chief of police for a declaration of his
rights and injunctive relief was instituted in Schrichte v. Born-
horn.'0 The appellant was transferred from detective to a regular
line shift with rank of acting first lieutenant without any change
in the rate of pay. The court, in affirming the circuit court, and
construing KRS 95.450(1) which provides that a police officer
shall not be reduced in grade or pay except for cause, held that
although a policeman's classification is changed when transferred
from one job category to another with comparable authority, his
9 374 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1964).
10 376 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1964).
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grade is not reduced within the statutory subdivision prohibiting
reduction in grade.
5. Zoning
During the last term the court had occasion to decide three
cases in the area of zoning. In the first of these, City of Middles-
boro v. Billingsley,"- the plaintiff city adopted a comprehensive
zoning ordinance, and sought to enjoin the use of business
property allegedly in violation of it. Defendant's business prop-
erty was being used for storage of construction equipment and
supplies when the area was zoned residential. The ordinance
provides that no nonconforming use could be changed to any
other nonconforming use unless the latter was found to be less
detrimental to the area than the existing use. Defendant later
changed the use of the property to the repairing and maintenance
of buses. The court, following existing law, reversed the lower
court, and held that the subsequent use, a noisy activity, was a
change contrary to the zoning ordinance prohibiting changes of
nonconforming uses unless such uses are less detrimental.
In A. B. Schlalter, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson C.P. & Z.C.,12
the Court of Appeals reaffinned the general rule that on appeal
the only question before the reviewing court was whether the
findings of the circuit court were supported by substantial evi-
dence. The court found they were adequately supported and
affirmed the lower court which denied appellant's application to
change the classification of his land, and thus denying the
zoning change.
Likewise, in Louisville Timber & Wooden Products Co. v. City
of Beechwood Village, the court reaffirmed the existing law that
the extraordinary equitable jurisdiction of the courts may be
resorted to in attacking the city's refusal to follow the recom-
mendations of the zoning commission to rezone appellants
property, only when the action complained of was arbitrary,
capricious or illegal, Accordingly, it was not arbitrary to deny
appellant the use of his property in a commercial manner, merely
because it was more suitable for such purpose than for a multi-
family dwelling to which the zoning ordinance restricts the use
of the property.
11 371 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1963).
12 374 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1964).
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B. CouNmNS
1. Fiscal Courts
The court decided four cases concerning aspects of county
fiscal courts during the last term. In Commonwealth v. Whayne
Supply Co.,13 only a procedural question was at issue. The action
was commenced by appellant and three other taxpapers to recover
alleged unauthorized and illegal expenditures of the county's
funds which were allegedly used to illegally purchase certain
road machinery from appellee and other corporations. The court,
reaffirming the existing rule and upholding the trial court, held
that the complaint must be dismissed as there was no allegation
therein that plaintiffs had demanded that the county or its fiscal
court sue defendants, or that such a demand would have been
futile.
Higdon v. Campbell County Fiscal Court4 presented an in-
teresting question and also contained a procedural point. The
fiscal court adopted a temporary ordinance, which by its own
terms, was to expire in one year. It provided for the filing of
applications by citizens seeking usage of property other than
for residential purposes. Seventeen days before the ordinance
was to expire, the fiscal court sued to enjoin appellants from using
their property for a trailer park in violation of the ordinance.
Subsequently, the ordinance expired before the twenty days al-
lowed by defendant to file an answer. The court held the suit
must be dismissed, reversing the trial court, since after the expira-
tion of the interim ordinance there was no law prohibiting the
use of the land as a trailer park, and therefore the question
became moot. This is the general rule, and the court had
previously applied it similarly to municipal ordinances.
A very unusual impasse confronted the court in Pulaski Fiscal
Court v. Floyd.'; The fiscal court ordered that the courthouse
doors be locked from 9 P.M. until 4 A.M. daily, and authorized
the county judge to have a lock and hasp installed on the back
door of the courthouse in which the county jail was located. The
front door of the courthouse was kept locked at night.
The disenting members of the fiscal court contended that the
13 371 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. 1963).
14 374 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1964).
1r 374 S.W.2d 863 (Ky. 1964).
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"lock and hasp" terminology of the order connotes a padlocking
of the back door from the outside, which would prevent unlocking
from the inside, thereby not only imprisoning the jailer, but
making it impossible for him to open up for the reception of
prisoners being brought in by police officers. In addition, it would
seem to conflict with KRS 67.130 providing that the jailer shall
be superintendent of all county buildings at the county seat. The
dissenting members appealed to the circuit court, which agreed
with them.
The fiscal court then appealed to the Court of Appeals which
held that the order was broad enough to encompass installation
of a locking device that would permit opening of the door from
the inside, and therefore, was not an unauthorized invasion of the
rights and prerogatives of the county jailer. In addition, the court
held that KRS 67.180 was not intended to deprive the fiscal court
of the power to regulate and control the fiscal affairs and
property of the county as provided by KRS 67.080(6). Although
this was apparently the first time this particular question had
been decided in Kentucky, the court followed an early Kentucky
case 6 as to the relative powers of the fiscal court and a county
jailer under these two statutes.
In the last case decided concerning fiscal courts, Pennyville
Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Higgins,17 the Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court and held that the appellant was entitled
to compensation for expenses relocating certain of its electric line
facilities which had been located on private property. In this
case the county desired to relocate certain county roads, and
some of the private property needed for such relocation was
occupied by appellants lines. The franchise granted by the
county to appellant provided that relocation of such lines from
the public property of the county shall be at the expense of the
appellant. The court distinguished Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Commonwealth' which pertained to public rights of way. The
court followed existing law that an easement owned by a utility
is property, and it cannot be divested without compensation to
the owning utility.
16 Owen Co. v. Greene, 129 Ky. 750, 112 S.W. 854 (1908).
17 379 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1964).
18 266 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1954).
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2. Conservation Districts
The only ease decided by the Court of Appeals during the
last term concerning conservation districts, Shelton v. Webster
County Soil Conservation Dist.,19 was instrumental in the repeal
of KRS 262.790, and the enactment of KRS 262.791.
KRS 262.790 provided that anytime twenty-five or more land-
owners within a soil conservation district filed a petition with the
county board of supervisors praying for discontinuance of the
district, and all the obligations of the district have been met, a
referendum shall be held under the supervision of the board with-
in sixty days. If a majority of the votes cast favor discontinuance,
the board of supervisors shall make a determination that the
district shall be discontinued. In the Shelton case, 276 landowners
petitioned the board. All other conditions of the statute were
satisfied. Nevertheless, the Webster County Board of Supervisors
decided it would not hold the referendum. Appellee sued, asking
the court to direct the referendum be held. The trial court so
ordered and the Court of Appeals affirmed. They held the statute
was satisfied and the board had no discretion in determining the
soundness of the reasons for discontinuance set forth in the peti-
tion. This was the first time this particular statute had been
construed.
The 1964 legislature apparently felt that watershed districts
could be discontinued too easily under KRS 262.790 and repealed
it. They replaced it with KRS 262.791 which makes it more
difficult to terminate such districts. Some of the important differ-
ences are: (1) a petition can not be filed with the board until at
least ten years after the organization of the district, five years
longer than the prior statute; (2) a majority of the landowners
within a district have to petition, whereas the previous statute
required only twenty-five; (3) the word "obligations" is clearly
defined, whereas only the word itself appeared in former statute.
C. ScHooLs A~N SCHOOL Dismicrs
1. Teacher Dismissals
In the first of two cases decided during the last term pertain-
ing to the dismissal of teachers, Bobb v. Moore,2 0 the court re-
19 377 S.W.2d 81 (Ky. 1964).
203 74 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1964).
1965]
KENTuGEy LAW JouuRNAL[Vl5,
stated the previous rule that individual county school board
members, as well as the board itself, may be liable for the
wrongful discharge of a teacher, even though the members acted
in good faith."- The board members relied on the Attorney
General's interpretation of the teacher tenure statute (KRS
161.740).
However, when the board's action was questioned, it set aside
sufficient funds to cover any damages incurred for such dismissal,
which were unexpended and available for the payment of
damages at the time of the action. This was apparently the first
time the Court of Appeals reviewed a case where the board took
such precautionary action. The court held that the funds set aside
by the board and unexpended should be used to satisfy damages
resulting from the wrongful discharge. However, in no event is
the board's liability to exceed any sums unexpended for the
position of the teacher. Here the board had not hired a replace-
ment.
In Board of Education v. Chattin,2' a hearing was conducted
by the appellant school board which resulted in a formal order
dismissing appellee, from which he appealed to the circuit court.
That court found the charges and proof insufficient to justify the
dismissal. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court and
held that a teacher's failure to comply with his superior official's
requirement that the teacher account separately for money
received from sales of merchandise and for receipts from contracts
and projects was sufficient ground for dismissal under KRS
161.790.
In the Guthrie28 case, decided previously, the Court of Appeals
held that the findings of the trial court in a proceeding of this
kind would not be set aside unless "clearly erroneous." But the
court in Chattin stated that if the dismissal were supported by
substantial evidence, it could not be set aside. Hence, to this
extent, Guthrie was modified.
In addition, the court in an early case, Bowman v. Ray, 4 ruled
that charges of immorality preferred against a school teacher by
21 Moore v. Babb, 343 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1960).
22 876 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1964).23 Guthrie v .Board of Education of Jefferson County, 298 S.W.2d 691 (Ky.
1957).
24 118 Ky. 110, 80 S.W. 516 (1904).
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the county superintendent were insufficient where he failed to
allege the dates of the specific acts alleged. In the Chattin case,
the trial court held the charges were defective in as much as they
did not set forth exact times and places, nor specific acts or
omissions. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that charges
of this type are sufficient if they give fair notice of their bases and
essential nature, and enable the accused to prepare his case.
Consequently, to the extent that Bowman conflicted, it was over-
ruled.
2. Compensation
Board of Education of Nelson County v. Lawrence 5 was the
only decision of the court concerning compensation decided
during the last term. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court and restated the existing law that by virtue of KRS 161.760
a teacher with a continuing service status, once promoted in
salary, cannot be demoted in salary without such cause as would
justify termination of her contract, even though part of her duties
or responsibilities are eliminated. The appellee was removed from
her position as principal, held by her the year before, with a
corresponding reduction in salary. The court also rejected ap-
pellant's contention that the Minimum Foundation Law (KRS
157.820(18, 14) and 157.350(8) ), which requires that all teachers
having the same qualifications are required to be paid the same
base salary, based on a single salary schedule, repealed KRS
161.760. The court said the law also provides that the single
salary schedule shall be based on training, experience and "other
factors," and that KRS 161.760 means the continuation of extra
pay is not for extra duties, but for extra qualifications. Therefore,
there is no contradiction.
D. ADiAmST TrV-E AGENCiES
Appeals from decisions of state administrative agencies con-
stitute an increasing percentage of the cases which come before
the Court of Appeals. The last term was no exception as several
cases arose concerning the scope of operations of such agencies,
as well as the limitations on appeal therefrom. Most of these cases
involved statutory interpretation.
25 375 S.W.2d 830 (Ky. 1968).
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1. Public Service Commission
In the only case decided by the court concerning the Public
Service Commission, City of Covington v. Board of Commis-
sioners,2" two questions were presented. The first was whether a
certificate of public convenience and necessity is required to be
issued by the Commission, where a county water district desires
to expand its water plant by slightly less than fifty percent
($424,000) of its original investment ($1,000,000). KRS 278.020
provides that any person who begins the construction of any
such plant, must obtain a certificate, unless it is an ordinary
extension of an existing system in the usual course of business.
The court held that the magnitude of the proposed extension
demonstrated that it was not ordinary, and therefore a certificate
was required.
Secondly, the court had to decide whether the refusal of the
Public Service Commission to grant a certificate was unreason-
able. The appellants contended the proposed extension would be
a wasteful duplication of the existing similar facilities of the city
within the county. The court held the refusal was unreasonable
since one facility could not be a duplication of another unless it
was an adequate substitute for the other. The court stated the
word "duplication" carries a concept of exactness of kind and
character. This case represents no change in existing law.
2. Department of Motor Transportation
The Court of Appeals had occasion to decide three cases
during the last term pertaining to the Department of Motor
Transportation. In the first of these, Red Arrow Delivery, Inc. v.
Greyhound Corp.,27 the court was engaged to construe the term
"regular route" as used in KRS 281.011. Here the Department
granted a regular route common carrier truck certificate to the
applicant. Deliveries by it were not to be by strict schedule, but
only when there were parcels to be delivered. The court held
this type operation is encompassed within the term "regular
route" as there is a fixed course and fixed termini, and regularity
of operations is unnecessary. All that is necessary is that the
carrier promptly transport between fixed points such goods as are
26 371 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1963).
273 77 S.W.2d 596 (Ky. 1964).
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tendered to him for transportation. This case follows the existing
statutory interpretation.
In Webb Transfer Line, Inc. v. Jones,2" the court reaffirmed
the existing law that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable
to the field of administrative law. In 1957, Jones received a
regular route certificate from the Department. The circuit court
reversed the order on the ground that the service of Webb, an
existing certificate holder, was adequate. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. Subsequently, in 1960, Jones again received a certificate
based on evidence of Webb's inadequate service prior to 1957.
On appeal by Webb, the Court of Appeals held that the doctrine
of res judicata prohibited a finding of inadequacy of service on
a later application for a certificate predicated on the previously
adjudicated period of time. Moreover, the court followed the
existing statutory construction in stating that upon an application
for additional motor freight service, a finding of inadequacy of
existing service cannot be based on the fact there will be more
business in the future than the present carrier is now handling.
KRS 281.630, in effect, allows such a finding only when the exist-
ing service is inadequate.
The only question presented in Hazard Express v. Combs
Motor Freight Inc.,29 was whether the evidence supported the
findings of the trial court which upheld the Department and
denied the applicant an extension of its common carrier service.
The court held this general rule was satisfied where the evidence
demonstrated the general unfitness, frail financial status, and
inadequate existing service of the applicant.
3. Kentucky Racing Commission
An interesting question was presented to the court in the only
case decided by it concerning the Kentucky Racing Commission,
Bobinchuck v. Levitch.0 Plaintiff entered a claim for a horse,
but when it was delivered, it was discovered that neurotomies
had been performed on the horse. Plaintiff refused to accept the
horse and the stewards ordered the claiming price returned to
plaintiff. The Racing Commission reversed the ruling of the
stewards, and the circuit court dismissed plaintiff's suit because
2s8 379 S.W.2d 444 (Ky. 1964).
.9372 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1963).
-0 380 S.W.2d 233 (Ky. 1964).
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it lacked jurisdiction. Plaintiff argued on appeal that KRS chapter
280 limits the power of the Commission to the assessment and
revocation of fines, suspensions and licenses, and it has no right
to determine controversies affecting private property rights of
individuals, since such would be an unconstitutional delegation
of authority. The court rejected this reasoning and reaffirmed the
existing law that the Commission has authority to make rules
and regulations governing horse racing in general in Kentucky,
including private property rights. The courts have long upheld
the rights of such commissions to perform the functions created
by statute.
4. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board
In the first of two cases decided during the last term affecting
the activities of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, Moberly
v. Johnson,81 the Court of Appeals affrmed the lower court which
had reversed the decision of the Board refusing to issue a retail
beer license to the appellees. The court followed the existing
rule that the Board's conclusions must be justified by the evidence.
Here the fact that the unincorporated town had no local police
(though it was patrolled by state and county police), that
another tavern was located approximately five hundred feet from
appellee's premises, and that a school was located seven-tenths
of a mile therefrom, did not justify the Board in refusing to grant
the license.
Carter v. Moberly12 presented the question of whether the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board could overrule the decision of
its malt beverage administrator who refused to grant a retail
malt beverage license to applicants, where sufficient proof was
introduced at the hearing before the Board to sustain the ad-
ministrator's refusal to issue the license. The court, in affirming
the lower court and sustaining the Board, restated the existing
rule that the administrator's refusal did not become a final
determination of the matter after a review had been requested
with the Board. After conducting a hearing, the Board itself was
required to make the final determination of whether the license
should be granted.
2' 376 S.W.2d 529 (Ky. 1964).
82876 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1964).
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5. Department of Fish and Wildlife
The Court of Appeals had occasion to decide only one case
during the last term concerning the activities of the Fish & Wild-
life Department. In Pritchett v. Marshall,33 the court reaffirmed
existing law based on statutory interpretation by holding that the
Commissioner of the Department may not employ private counsel
and pay them out of public funds, even though the Fish and
Wildlife Resources Commission approved the order.
KRS 12.210 authorizes a "department" to employ counsel at
public expense only upon the approval of the governor. KRS
150.021 specified that the Department of Fish and Wildlife
Resources was "a statutory administrative department of the
state government" within the meaning of KRS chapter 12. The
court, in reversing the trial court, rejected the Department's con-
tention that because KRS chapter 12 was subsequently amended
in some respects without mentioning the Fish and Wildlife
Resources Department, a legislative intent was manifested to
remove the Department wholly from the purview of KRS chapter
12. The court held the legislative intent was simply to preserve
the Department's status quo, and no more.
6. Department of Military Affairs
In Commonwealth v. Herrell,34 the only case decided during
the last term concerning the Department of Military Affairs, the
court, in affirming the trial court, held that neither the state nor
the Department had standing to maintain an action against a
defendant to recover amounts allegedly obtained by defendant
from veterans who assigned their bonus claims to him. Neither
the state nor the Department have any proprietary interest in the
proceeds of the bonus checks, and that only a veteran would have
such a cause of action. The court rejected the Department's argu-
ment that its legal standing to maintain the action was implied
by KRS 40.230, authorizing the administrator of the Department
to make rules and regulations for the implementation of KRS
chapter 40.
333 75 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1963).





The Court of Appeals had occasion to decide one case per-
taining to the nomination of public officials. In Anggelis v.
Land,5 plaintiff brought a proceeding to direct the county court
clerk to issue him a certificate of nomination as the party nominee
for office of state senator from the twelfth senatorial district. By
the Redistricting Act of 1963, the old thirteenth district was
divided in half, thereby comprising two districts-the twelfth and
thirteenth. Since only senators in the odd numbered districts
were to be elected in November of 1963, plaintiff contended that
the new twelfth senatorial district would not be represented in
the 1964 senate. However, the court held that the Redistricting
Act merely changed the geographic boundaries of the twelfth
district, and did not create a vacancy in that district so as to
necessitate an election. This was a case of first instance in
Kentucky.
2. Recovery and Removal
The court decided one case concerning the recovery from a
public official and also one pertaining to the removal of a public
official during the last term. In McKenzie v. Commonwealth,36
an action was brought against a former sheriff for the amount of
an execution, including penalty and interest, pursuant to KRS
426.350 which provides such relief for the plaintiff in execution.
The sheriff made the levy on the judgment debtor's property, but
refused to consumate the sale because he learned the judgment
debtor had filed a petition to be adjudged a bankrupt, and letters
from the referee and trustee in bankruptcy advised him not to
make the sale. However, no order was issued by the federal court
to nullify the execution lien, nor had the trustee or referee
initiated proceedings to have the lien set aside or to subject the
property of the bankrupt to the orders of the federal court. The
court, in affirming the trial court, held this did not amount to
reasonable excuse under the statute, and therefore the sheriff was
liable for the amount of the execution. The interest, nevertheless,
should only run from the date of judgment. The court followed
federal decisions holding similarly.
35 871 S.W.2d 857 (Ky. 1963).
36 373 S.W.2d 595 (Ky. 1963).
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Commonwealth v. Collins37 was concerned with whether a
board of education member, who was also an officer and principal
stockholder in a soft drink bottling firm, vacated his office by
selling soft drinks to various schools in the system in which the
company had placed vending machines. The profits from such
drinks were used by the schools to purchase equipment and
services, leaving only the remainder to pay the company. KRS
160.180(1) (e) (2) provided that the office of a board member
shall be vacated if such member is directly or indirectly interested
in the sale to the board of materials, supplies or services for which
school funds are expended. The court, in reversing the circuit
court, held the appellee's conduct directly violated the statute,
and his office was thereby vacated. This case reaffims a previous
Kentucky case 8 that such sales are improper despite the mem-
ber's motives or the unprofitable nature of the sales to him.
3. Prosecution
The court had occasion to decide only one case relative to the
prosecution of a public official-Commonwealth v. Howard.3 9
Here a water district commissioner was indicted for receiving a
profit on public funds (KRS 61.190) and for taking a bribe [KRS
432.350(2)]. Funds were deposited with the water district by
developers of various subdivisions, which funds were disbursed
by the district in payment for construction of water distribution
and sewerage systems in the subdivisions. In a previous action,
the court found there existed an arrangement, among the con-
tractor, appellee and two other commissioners, for the payment
of "kickbacks" to the three commissioners, and that these pay-
ments were for an illegal purpose. The appellee contended
that: (1) such funds were held by the water district only as an
escrow agent; and (2) assuming they were public funds, they
became private when the contractor obtained possession of them.
In answer to appellee's first argument, the court held that
although the funds came from a private source, they became
public funds when paid over to the water district, and it in turn
became responsible for their proper disbursement. Hence, they
are not held by the district as escrow agent but are "public funds"
37 379 S.W.2d 436 (Ky. 1964).38 Douglas v. Pittman, 239 Ky. 548, 39 S.W.2d 979 (1931).
39 379 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1964).
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within the statute prohibiting a public officer from receiving a
profit on them [KRS 432.350(21)]. The court followed existing
case law on this point.
Likewise, the court rejected appellee's second contention.
The court stated that public funds do not become private funds
when they are paid to the contractor who allegedly "kicked" them
back to the commissioner. Public funds do not lose their public
character when paid out for an illegal purpose. The court also
followed existing law in holding that a water district commissioner
is an officer within the meaning of the statutes prohibiting a public
officer from receiving profit on public funds or from taking a
bribe.
II. COMMERCIAL LAW
Home Finance Co. v. Ratliff"° was an action arising out of
what apparently was thought to be an unreasonable disposition
of a repossessed automobile by the secured creditor. The court
does not, however, face the issue of commercial reasonableness
as would be required by Kentucky's Uniform Commercial Code,41
since the appeal was directed at the question of damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed a compensatory damages award equiva-
lent to the purchase price in effect four months prior to repos-
session, and allowed a deduction by defendant of the balance
owed by the plaintiff on the note. The court reversed the award
of punitive damages on the grounds that "at best the unfortunate
incident can be regarded as [ordinary] negligence."2
Briefly the facts were: (1) the finance company, subsequent
to a default by the purchaser, repossessed his automobile; (2) a
public auction was scheduled and the plaintiff was duly notified;
(8) before the auction, an automobile dealer took possession in
anticipation of acceptance of his standing bid for that particular
automobile; (4) at the time scheduled, the defendant contends,
"the car was offered for sale-albeit in absentia-whereas [plain-
tiff] ... maintains... no sale of any kind was had."43
The court held that "Ratliff was deprived of the benefit of a
public sale of the car under the advertised and normal circum-
stances [and that] appellant was remiss in its obligation to Ratliff
to conduct a proper sale."44 However, all that the plaintiff is
entitled to under the Code is a "commercially reasonable" disposi-
tion and reasonable notice, but the court seemingly was reluctant
to use that statutory language or even make reference to it.
KRS 355.9-503 covers the secured party's right to repossession;
KRS 855.9-504 and 355.9-507 cover in considerable detail the
secured party's right to dispose of collateral after default and
acceptable ways of so doing; KRS 355.9-506 covers the debtor's
right to redeem the collateral which apparently the jury below
and the Court of Appeals felt was denied him here, inter alia;
KRS 355.9-507 provides remedies and minimum damages for the
40 374 S.W1.2d 494 (Ky. 1964).
41 Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.9-504, -507(2).
42 Home Finance Co. v. Ratliff, 374 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Ky. 1964).
43 Id. at 495.
44 Id. at 496.
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debtor where the creditor has failed in his duty of good faith or
commercially reasonable conduct. Proper use of these sections
would undoubtedly have cast this case into a somewhat different
perspective.45
In G.M.A.C. v. Holbrook4 the court, on the defendant's state-
ment of facts and issues, reversed a Magoffm circuit court jury
verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, for wrongful repossession
by the defendant finance company. The court said:
it appears . . . that the repossession was valid and proper
because the terms of the conditional sales contract had been
violated [and] the alleged statement of the repossessing agent,
in response to [plaintiff's] offer to pay . . . as soon as the
repairs on the automobile were complete, that he 'thought it
would be all right,' could not be construed a waiver.47
Note that the rights of a secured party to take possession after
a default are adequately covered by Kentucky's version of the
Uniform Commercial Code48 although the court again failed to
mention same.
45 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-507, comments 1 and 2.




During the last term, the Court of Appeals decided five cases
in the realm of condemnation law which were of major signifi-
cance and several others which contained restatements and
affirmances of existing rules or dealt primarily with procedure.
The major cases will be discussed and analyzed individually and
those of relatively minor significance from the standpoint of
modifications in the existing law will be summarized within
specific categories wherever possible.
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Fister,49 the question
was which factors the court should consider in its determination
of the reasonableness of an award, given the fact that an award
of some size should have been rendered. Recognizing the wide
disparity between the value estimates of the landowner's wit-
nesses and those of the condemnor's witnesses which existed in
the principal case, and generally in most condemnation cases
where valuation is in conflict, the court held the jury's verdict to
be unreasonable. They then proceeded to set out one test for
determining the reasonableness of an award insofar as the testi-
mony of the property owner is concerned.
At one time the property owner was qualified to testify to
the value of his property without restriction and then later the
rule was qualified so that any basis shown to be irrelevant would
be stricken from the evidence and the jury would be told to
disregard his opinion on this point as a measure of value. The
court adopted a new rule. Now, a property owner must be quali-
fied affirmatively to testify as to present value of his property, just
as any other witness must be. Then, after the owner has estab-
lished prima facie qualifications and expressed his opinion, the
qualifications and credibility of the owner's evidence may be
further examined just as in the case of any other witness. The
new rule should at least provide more uniformity in the rules
allowing property valuation estimates and facilitate the jury in
reaching a reasonable award.
The court then addressed itself to other contentions raised by
the appellant and stated that these issues would be governed at
40 373 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1963).
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the new trial by the principles set forth in Commonwealth v.
Tyree,5" and Commonwealth v. Sherrod.5'
A case following in logical sequence to Fister is Common-
wealth v. Cardinal Hill Nursery, Inc.,52 where the court clarified
several important cases53 dealing with the admissibility of evi-
dence fixing individual "price tags" on factors which bear on the
valuation opinion of an appraisal witness. The court says:
It is the opinion of the court that appraisal witnesses on direct
examination may, after proper qualification as to competence,
testify to the before and after market value of the property
involved. Such witnesses, on direct examination, may relate
any pertinent factors considered by them in arriving at the
values to which they have testified; in so doing they may
state their estimate of the amount by which a major structure
enhances the "before" value of the land to which it is affixed,
and in support of that estimate may testify as to the cost,
original or reproduction, less depreciation, of the structure,
upon the conditions and under the limitations set forth in
Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Stamper. 54 ... How-
ever, upon direct examination it is not proper for appraisal
witnesses to ascribe an itemized price tag to "damage" factors.
But on cross examination it is appropriate to make inquiry
of the witness as to whether he has indeed ascribed particular
amounts to "damage" factors. This is not to show "after"
market value; it is to test the probative value of the evidence
in chief from the witness. Some factors are not compensable;
they are classified as damnum absque injuria. Certainly it
would be fallacious to foreclose the cross-examiner's right to
elicit from the appraisal witness admissions that he has priced
such factors in his "after" market value testimony.55
503 65 S.W.2d 472 (Kv. 1963).
51367 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1963). A companion case which grew out of the
case discussed here is Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Fister, 376 S.W.2d
543 (Ky. 1964) in which the court ruled on a petition requesting an amendment
to the mandate in the original Fister case assessing the cost of the appeal against
Fister, the unsuccessful party. The court ruled that it was not an abridgment
of §§ 13 and 242 of the Kentucky Constitution to assess this cost against the
landowner if he was the unsuccessful party. An explanation of the original
Fister case is contained in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Raleigh, 375
S.W.2d 384 (Ky. 1964) where the court acts out the transition of this rule from
Barron v. Phelps, 238 S.W.2d 1016 (Ky. 1951) to the original Fister case.
52380 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. 1964).
53 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Sherrod, 367 S.W.2d 844 (Ky.
1963;); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Stamper, 345 S.W.2d 640 (Ky.
1961); and, Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Tyree, 365 S.W.2d 472 (Ky.
1963).
54345 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1961).
55 Commonwealth v. Cardinal Hill Nursery, Inc., supra note 52 at 253.
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Therefore, under the existing law, appraisal witnesses may, on
direct examination, relate the factors considered by them in
arriving at their estimate of the "before" and "after" condemna-
tion values of property but they cannot present particular "dam-
age" factors which are assigned specific amounts. Then, on
cross-examination, it is proper for the opposing counsel to elicit
testimony as to the "damage" factors merely for the purpose of
determining probative values, inasmuch as some of the factors
considered may not be compensable.
The court, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Barker,6
was confronted with the problem of whether to take jurisdiction
over a situation where the condemnor failed to appeal to the
circuit court. The county court judgment was for $895.24 and the
property owner alone appealed. The circuit court judgment was
for 3000 dollars, obviously enough to meet the 2500 dollar require-
ment for an appeal as a matter of right. 7 But the court held that
the condemnor's failure to appeal the county court judgment
amounted to an admission of liability and therefore the "amount
in controversy"'s was the $2104.75 difference between the judg-
ment of the county court and that of the circuit court. This meant
that the appeal was governed by RCA 1.180, by virtue of KRS
21.080, which gives the Court of Appeals power to make its own
rules in appeals of cases involving less than 2500 dollars. In
rendering the decision, the court partially overruled Greenwade
v. Williams, 9 where it was said that the amount of the judgment
against a defendant is the amount in controversy upon an appeal
by the defendant. It overrules to the extent it may be construed
to apply to a defendant who has conceded liability on a prior
judgment. Since the condemnor prosecuted the appeal as a
"matter of right" under KRS 21.060, rather than as prescribed by
RCA 1.180, governing appeals of less than 2,500 dollars, the
appeal was dismissed. The new rule seems reasonable although
rather harsh on the condemnor in the principal case.
There is a definite problem of what property to compare to
measure the value of that in question and what type of use of the
560 379 S.W.2d 481 (Ky. 1964).
57 KRS 21.060.
is KRS 21.070.
59 281 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1955).
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property compared is the proper criterion in determining the
condemned value. Robinette v. Commonwealth, 0 is helpful con-
cerning both comparable property and use of land. Relating to
the subject of comparable property, the court held that even if
the property which is put into evidence for comparison is not
being used for exactly the same purpose as the condemned land,
so long as it sufficiently resembles the condemned land, it may be
admitted in evidence to bear on the issue of value and to be of
aid to the jury. In the principal case, comparable property located
within five miles of the condemnee's land which was sold within
three years of the taking was held proper evidence to take into
consideration. Finally, the court set out the ultimate test which
should be used in determining the highest and best use of the
land, which is: "The ultimate test of the type of use which is
properly the criterion of market value is the use to which men of
prudence and wisdom, having adequate means, would devote the
property if owned by them."6' The court qualified this test by
stating that where income is derived mainly from the skill of the
operator in using the property rather than from the productivity
of the property itself, testimony pertaining to that income should
be excluded since this is a non-compensable matter.
The last case of primary importance is Milby v. Louisville
Gas and Electric Co.,62 where the court was presented with a
novel situation. The valuation problem dealt with rights to an
underground storage space for gas. Although there were no
known sales in Kentucky of such rights nor were there any sales
of land in which the existence of storage space was a factor
bearing on the sale price, the court found a solution. There were
a substantial number of leases of underground storage space and
it was held "that an established lease value is a fair basis from
which to measure market value."3 The court also discussed the
rule to be applied when the space is the subject of competitive
demand and the demand is only by public service corporations
that have the power of eminent domain. Simply stated, the rule
is basically the same provided that a number of leases are
60 880 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1964).
61 Id. at 88.
62 875 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1968).
63 Id. at 240.
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introduced into evidence to prove this value rather than just a
single lease.6 4
There were five decisions65 which dealt primarily with the
rights to an appeal. Two of the cases66 concerned an appeal
where all of the defendants in the original action were not made
parties to the appeal. The court ruled that this was not necessary
since it would be serving no useful purpose to draw in a defendant
who was satisfied with the judgment in the lower court. However,
the court held that the non-appealing defendants lost their right
to appeal when they failed to appeal a lower court judgment.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Chenault,67 involved a
situation where both parties filed an appeal to circuit court but
the owner failed to file a copy of the county court judgment
within 30 days as required by statute.' The defect was cured
by the court having before it the copy filed by the condemnor.
The court rejected the argument of the condemnor that they
could withdraw their appeal and the copy of the judgment and
leave the owner without recourse.
Another case dealing with the right to an appeal69 held that
when the Commonwealth does not appeal from the award in
the county court, the issue of excessive compensation is closed
and no longer justiciable in the same proceeding. The court also
held that on appeal to the circuit court, if the judgment rendered
was smaller than that awarded in the county court and the
Commonwealth has not appealed, the appellant is entitled to
the county court judgment since not allowing this would have
the effect of giving the Commonwealth an automatic cross-appeal.
The last case on the subject"0 dealt with the failure of the
Commonwealth to make a remainderman a party appellee to its
appeal. The court held that the remainderman was an indis-
04 Ibid.
05 Sheffield v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 376 S.W.2d 688 (Ky.
1964); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Kelley, 376 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1964);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. C. S. Brent Seed Co., 376 S.W.2d 310 (Ky.
1964); Riley v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Chenault, 371 S.W.2d 948
(Ky. 1963).
ooShefield v. Commonwealthf, and Riley v. Commonwealth, supra note 65.
67371 S.W.2d 948 (Ky. 1963).
68 KRS 177.087.0 Commonwealth v. C. S. Brent Seed Co., supra note 65.
70Comonwalthv. Kelley, .supra note 65. The court also stated in this case
that they were overruling so much of Big Sandy fly. Co. v. Dils, 120 Ky. 563, 87
S.W 310 (1905) that deals with the question of proper appeal.
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pensable party and that without him being named specifically
in the caption, the appeal should be dismissed. The reason for
requiring that the remainderman be named in the caption is that
in the statement of the parties to the appeal, the Commonwealth
stated that they were named in the caption.
Seven cases7 were generally concerned with comparable
property. Three72 were from the same circuit court and con-
cerned the same issue in regard to condemnation of land for
the relocation of the same highway. The circuit court had
affirmed a decision to disallow evidence as to the price paid for
comparable property and the Court of Appeals simply held that
such an error is reversible.
One case73 pertained to an exclusion of evidence presented
by the Commonwealth's witness of the sale of another church in
the same county, the buildings being of different construction
and age. Held: Reversible error. Since church properties sell so
seldom, any "reasonably comparable" sale should have been
admitted for evidentiary purposes and any dissimilarities brought
out by examination of the witness at the trial.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. McCready,4 held it is
not error to admit a subdivision plat in evidence or to place a
subdivision value on an undeveloped tract of land where the land
has been purchased for a subdivision long before interstate
highways were even conceived, and part of the property has
already been developed.
Reaffirmance of a very important rule occurred in one de-
cision;75 the rule stating that a witness as to value need not be
an expert on property but only needs to know the property to be
valued and the value of property in the vicinity and have the
71 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Shackleford, 380 S.W.2d 77 (Ky.
1964); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Lemar, 375 S.W.2d 678 (Ky.
1964); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Howard, 375 S.W.2d 398 (Ky.
1964); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Oakland United Baptist Church,
372 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1963y; Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Slusher, 371
S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1963); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. McCready, 371
S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1963); and Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Herndon, 378
S.W.2d 620 (Ky. 1964).72 Commonwealth v. Shackleford, Commonwealth v. Lemar, Commonwealth
v. Howard, supra note 71.
73 Commonwealth v. Oakland United Baptist Church, supra note 71.
74371 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1963).75 Commonwealth v. Slusher, supra note 71,
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ability to make a reasoned inference. In another restatement of
an eisting rule, the court held that it was error to admit evidence
or prices paid in other condemnation suits in the area as bearing
on the market value of the property and that the property owner
has no vested interest in traffic which will be diverted from the
old road to another.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Herndon,7 ' held that
it is improper for a jury to consider damages from the closing of
one road from the property into town where two other roads of
like suitability were available; evidence of sale price received
by other owners as unwilling sellers; and the price the property
was listed for with a real estate broker.
Three cases77 were concerned with the problem of a change
in access to the public highway system after the condemnation.
The court decided two cases78 where the access was less than
before the taking, and one case7 9 where the access was greater
than before the taking. Held: A landowner is not entitled to be
compensated for loss of his prior access to the public highway
system provided that the condemnor left the landowner with
reasonable access to the highway. The court also held on the
question of enhancement in value as a result of being nearer to
interchanges, that it is proper for the condemnor to introduce
evidence to prove that this enhancement came about as a
result of their taking of the condemned property.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Phillips,"0 also dealing
with an access problem, held that where the condemnor's ap-
praiser admitted that loss of access was a factor, it was not
erroneous to admit testimony as to the decreased accessibility of
the land remaining and in allowing testimony as to the damages
to the entire tract of land where it was not broken down as to the
taking and the damage to the remainder.
7378 S.W.2d 620 (Ky. 1964).
77 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Denny, 880 S.W.2d 233 (Ky. 1964);
The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co., a Corporation v.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 376 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1964); and Cartee v.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 874 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1964). The court
also stated, in the Denny case, that they were overruling so much of Common-
wealth, Dep't of Highways v. Carlisle, 36 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1963), as attributed
controlling significance to the pleadings in condemnation cases.78 Commonwealth v. Denny, and Commonwealth v. Cartee, supra note 77.
79 Cincinnati, N.O.T.P. Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, supra note 77.
8o 379 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. 1964).
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There were four cases8' similar because they involved some
factor affecting the value of the property condemned or determi-
nation of the recipient directly. In Whitley City Church of Christ
v. Whitley City Christian Church,2 the issue was which church
was entitled to the condemnation award where they were
formally the same organization but prior to the taking, they
separated. The court held that the group entitled to recover the
award was the one which represented the original church body
and that this question would be determined by seeing which one
represented the original church in matters of religious doctrine
and observances. The church which remained substantially the
same with respect to these matters was entitled to the recovery.
One case 3 held that it was error to exclude evidence of the
amount of a past appraisal (1956) for mortgage purposes but
not reversible error because the existence of the appraisal was
known to the jury in the principal case and they had heard
enough to realize that it must have placed a lower valuation on
the property. The owner had contended that a mortgage valua-
tion is not an indication of market value.
Commonwealth, Dep&t of Highways v. Wood, 4 held it er-
roneous to allow evidence of the value of the property taken as
of the day of a public hearing which informed the public of the
proposed construction, since the correct measure of recovery is
the fair market value of the property just before the project is
generally known. In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v.
Houchins,85 it was held that the jury should be sent to view the
premises where the alleged damage included destruction of
building lot value and the property owner so requested. There
was a question of whether the lots were so suited and the
condemnee requested under KRS 177.087, and the denial was
reversible error.
The court had the opportunity to consider the question of
the propriety of the appellee's counsel's statement to the jury in
81 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Finley, 371 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1963);
Commonwealth, DeR't of Highways v. Wood, 380 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1964);
Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Houchins, 380 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1964). and
Whitley City Church of Christ v. Whitley City Christian Church, 373 S.W.2d 423
(Ky. 1963).
82 373 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. 1963).8 3 Commonwealth v. Finley, supra note 81.
843 80 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1964).
858880 S.W.2d 95 ( Ky. 1964).
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his opening remarks in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v.
Swift.8 He included the amount of the county commissioners'
award. Held: Such a statement is analogous to a remark by one
of the counsel that the opposing party has liability insurance
coverage and that such a remark will entitle the opposing party
to a declaration of a mistrial.
There were five other significant cases winding up the past
term of the Court of Appeals. One decision 7 held it erroneous to
refuse a motion for a directed verdict or for a verdict n.o.v. where
the condemnor had introduced the only evidence as to value
and the jury returned a much larger verdict than the evidence
indicated. Another 8 concerned an original proceeding to the
court for an injunction to prevent the county judge from issuing
a writ of possesion, which was denied because the owner had
an adequate remedy for injunction in the circuit court. Here,
the circuit court had denied an injunction, but the petitioner's
action to the Court of Appeals was styled an original proceed-
ing rather than an appeal from the circuit court. In Common-
wealth, Dep't of Highways v. Brahnam,89 the court reamfrmed the
rule that it is proper to allow the admission of tax returns as
evidence in order to try to establish the value of the property
condemned while it was being used for a certain purpose.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Frank Fehr Brewing Com-
pany,"( held that where the opposing party put on as an expert
valuation witness, a person who had not been disclosed to the
Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth failed to ask for a
continuance or a delay in order to examine the new witness, this
constituted a waiver of the right to do so and was not proper
grounds for a reversal. The last case" which will be discussed
here, dealt with an original condemnation complaint which
described the property incorrectly and an amended complaint
which was correct. The appraisers actually inspected the correct
property, and it was held not to be grounds for a motion to
appoint a new commission to inspect the property.
80375 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. 1964).
87 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Brooke, 380 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1964).
Ss Stillpass v. Niblick, 378 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1964).
89 380 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1964).
90 376 S.W.2d 541 (Ky. 1964).
N Whitesburg Municipal Housing Comm'n v. Hale, 371 S.W.2d 482 (Ky.
1963).
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During the 1962-1963 term, there were two cases which are
having a profound influence on condemnation law. The two cases
are Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Tyree,9 2 and Common-
wealth, Dep't of Highways v. Sherrod 3 They established both
rules for determining the proper amount of an award and the
procedure to be followed in resolving the amount, and their
principles have been adhered to this past term.94
92 365 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1963).
93367 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1963).
94 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Lanter, 379 S.W.2d 233 (Ky. 1964)
(Sherrod); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. King, 375 S.W.2d 688 (Ky.
1964) (Sherrod); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Brubaker, 375 S.W.2d 404
(Ky. 1964) (Tyree); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Darch, 374 S.W.2d 490
(Ky. 1964) (Tyree and Sherrod); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Baston,
371 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1963) (Tyree and Sherrod); and Davis v. Commonwealth,
Dep't of Highways, 374 S.W.2d 513 (Ky. 1963) (Sherrod).
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Kentucky Court of Appeals rendered nine decisions95 in
the field of constitutional law during their 1963-1964 term. The
constitutionality of state statutes was the concern of seven cases90
and in only one97 was the statute in question held unconstitutional.
A brief summary follows and then each decision will be analyzed
and discussed separately.
A petition for mandamus by convicted defendants to compel
a judge to supply them with a record of the trial was denied. 8
The Department of Highways was held to be immune from suit
both on the contract price for work performed and for damages
for breach of contract.99 The court upheld the constitutionality
of the Kentucky Billboard Act, 10 the Junk Yard Act,101 the Arts
and Crafts Loan Fund Act,0 2 and the Nursing Home and
Personal Care Home Loan Fund Act.1u3 A statute'0 4 author-
izing the Commissioner of Finance to enter into agreements with
other states or the federal government on joint unemployment
compensation programs was held constitutional.10 Absentee
voting provisions covering students and federal employees 06 did
not deprive other groups of voting rights, nor did the provisions
violate the constitutional requirements for general registration
9 Schroader v. Bratcher, 380 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. 1964); Commonwealth v.
Associated Industries of Kentucky, 370 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1963); Foley Construc-
tion Co. v. Ward, 375 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1964); Hallahan v. Mittlebeeler, 373
S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1963); Stovall v. Eastern Baptist Institute and Stovall v.
Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1964); Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375
S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964); Cook v. Ward, 381 S.W.2d 168 (Ky. 1964); Moore v.
Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); and American Beauty Homes Corp. v.
Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 450
(Ky. 1964).
06 Commonwealth v. Associated Industries of Kentucky, Hallahan v. Mittle-
beeler, Stovall v. Eastern Baptist Institute and Stovall v. Commonwealth, Jasper
v. Commonwealth, Cook v. Ward, Moore v. Ward, and American Beauty Homes
Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm n, supra
note 95.
97American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning
and Zoning Comm'n, supra note 95.
98 Schroader v. Bratcher, supra note 95.99 Foley Construction Co. v. Ward, supra note 95.
100 KES 177.830-990; Moore v. Ward, supra note 95.
' 0 1 KRS 177.905-990; Jasper v. Commonwealth, supra note 95.
102 KRS 152.410-480; Stovall v. Eastern Baptist Institute and Stovall v. Com-
monwealth, supra note 95.
103 KBS 216.750-780; Stovall v. Eastern Baptist Institute and Stovall v.
Commonwealth, supra note 95.
104 KRS 341.145(3) (a).
105 Commonwealth v. Associated Industries of Kentucky, supra note 95.
10 6 Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 120.
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of voters.0 An amendment to a statute'0 8 providing that funds
should be allotted according to the provisions of KRS 177.360(1)
was upheld as not being an amendment to a statute by reference
to its title only.0 9 Finally, a statute"0 which provided for a trial
de novo in circuit court on appeal from zoning commission rulings
was struck down by the court as an unlawful delegation of power
to the courts in violation of the Kentucky Constitution"' and it
was indicated by way of dictum that the same ruling would apply
to appeals from board of adjustment rulings under KRS 100.085.:12
Commonwealth v. Associated Industries of Kentucky1 3 dealt
with the constitutionality of a statute" 4 which authorizes the
Commissioner of Economic Security to enter into agreements
with other states or the federal government on joint programs of
unemployment compensation. It was attacked as an unlawful
delegation of power under the Kentucky Constitution," 5 which
vests powers in the various branches of state government, and as
an unlawful distribution of state funds for a purpose other than
that for which the funds were collected in violation of the Ken-
tucky Constitution." 6 The court held that the Kentucky Con-
stitution does not by implication prohibit delegation and that
other sections of the constitution" 7 impliedly recognize the power
to delegate. The use of funds collected for the Kentucky unemploy-
ment program could be for a joint unemployment program with
other states and the federal government and still be within the
meaning of "used for the same purpose" as required by section
180.11 The court distinguished Unemployment Commission v.
Savage,"9 where a transfer of funds from the Unemployment
Compensation Fund to the federal government for payments
under the Federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act was
107 Hallahan v. Mittlebeeler, supra note 95.
108 KRS 179.410.
109 Cook v. Ward, supra note 95.
110 KRS 100.057.
1l Ky. Const. § 27.
112 American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning
and Zoning Comm'n, supra note 95.
113 370 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1963).114 KRS 341.145 (3) (a).
115 Ky. Const. §§ 27, 28 and 29.
116 Ky. Const. § 180.
"17 Ky. Const. §§ 156 and 166.
118 Ky. Const. § 180 provides that an act or ordinance levying any tax must
specify the purpose, for which alone the money can be used.
19 283 Ky. 301, 140 S.W.2d 1073 (1940).
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held to be an unlawful diversion of funds for a purpose foreign
to that for which they were originally collected, stating that a
change in the purpose of the fund took place in Savage.
Foley Construction Company v. Ward120 was an extremely
enlightening case on the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its
existence and use in Kentucky. The plaintiff sued the Kentucky
Department of Highways for damages for breach of contract and
for payment withheld on the contract price for the work per-
formed. A plea of sovereign immunity by the Department of
Highways as an agency of the state was held to be a valid defense
to the suit. No merit was established in the plaintiff's contention
that the authorization by the legislature for the agency to enter
into contracts impliedly authorizes the right to sue the agency.
The court handled this "mutuality of obligation" argument by
drawing an analogy to infant-adult contracts which are only
enforceable by one of the parties. Sovereign immunity was held
not to be relinquished by the legislature's act of granting the
right to sue in certain cases.
Watkins, Consulting Engineer v. Dep't of Highways121 was
distinguished because it did not involve the right to sue on a
contract but rather a determination of whether to enforce an
arbitration agreement. But, the court expressly overruled Derby
Road Building Company v. Commonwealth 22 which was based
on the mutuality of obligation dicta in the Watkins case. This is
indeed a giant's step in reverse to any trend in doing away with
sovereign immunity.
The Junkyard Act 12 3 prohibits unfenced junk yards within a
certain distance of public highways and its validity was attacked
in Jasper v. Commonwealth. 24 Aesthetic considerations alone
were held to be of sufficient public benefit to carry the provision
outside the realm of unreasonable exercise of the public welfare
power of the legislature. It was further held that the enforcement
power granted to the Commissioner of Highways was not an
unlawful delegation of power and that the penalties for violation
were not unreasonable. The attack by the plaintiff was based on
120.375 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1964).
121290 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. 1956).
122317 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1958).
123 KRS 177.905-990.
124 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964).
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U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV and section 13 of the Kentucky
Constitution, and the court stated that the act, if invalid, would
violate section 2 of the constitution which provides: "Absolute
and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of free-
men exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority."
A petition for mandamus filed by convicted defendants was
dismissed in Schroader v. Bratcher.125 The petition was framed to
compel a judge to supply the defendants with a record of their
trial and to obtain release from a penitentiary on the basis that
the constitutional rights of the parties were violated. The peti-
tion was held to be too general to show the alleged specific
violation of their rights.
In Stovall v. Eastern Baptist Institute and Stovall v. Com-
monwealth,12 6 the Arts and Craft Loan Fund Act'2 7 and the
Nursing Home and Personal Care Home Loan Fund Act, 28
which provides for loans to private companies and individuals in
these areas, were upheld. The Kentucky State Treasurer, Thelma
Stovall, refused to honor warrants for loans approved under the
acts and the plaintiffs appealed. The treasurer contended that
the acts were in violation of the Kentucky Constitution as an
unlawful delegation of power, 2 9 as serving a private rather than
a public purpose,180 and a lending of the credit of the Common-
wealth to an individual or company, and a donation to a com-
pany.'3 The court found that there was no unlawful delegation
of power following the Commonwealth v. Associated Industries
of Kentucky case.32 The promotion of arts and crafts and nursing
care for the elderly was upheld as a valid exercise of the public
welfare powers. The fact that there would also be some private
benefits under the acts did not negate their public purpose. The
acts were not a lending of the credit of the Commonwealth but
were merely a lending of money and the fact that private loans
were not available did not equate the loans with a donation.
The Billboard Act 33 prohibits signs within 660 feet of the
125 380 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. 1964).
126 375 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1964).
127 KRS 152.410-480.
128 KRS 216.750-780.
129 Ky. Const. § 27.
130 Ky. Const. §§ 3 and 171.
131 Ky. Const. § 177.
132 370 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1963).
133 KBS 177.830-990.
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right of way of any interstate, limited access highway or turnpike,
and its constitutionality was upheld in Moore v. Ward 34 against
contentions that it was unreasonable and arbitrary because such
signs bear no causal relationship to highway safety. It was
further contended that the act constituted a relinquishment of
the state's police power to the federal government,1 35 and that it
amounted to a taking of property without due process as well as
an ex post facto law. The act was held not unreasonable because
it had a valid public purpose in aesthetic considerations even if
it did not have a bearing on traffic safety, and therefore it was not
error in the lower court to exclude plaintiff's evidence that the
legislature made an incorrect evaluation. The court stated that
its function was not to inquire into the motives or correctness of
the legislature's evaluation. The fact that the state adopted the
same standards as the federal government was not a relinquish-
ment of the state's power, but was simply a legislative choice of
the best of standards for the state. Nor was it invalidated by the
fact that the adoption of federal standards was required for
federal subsidy.
There was not a taking of a property right because there is no
right to exploit state highways, and there was therefore a mere
refusal of a privilege which could be created and which could
constitutionally be taken away. The court noted the fact that
practically any exercise of the state's police power amounts to the
destruction of a property right in some form. The act was not
objectionable as ex post facto because private rights are always
subject to public rights, and it was not unreasonable because it
went no further than necessary to protect the public interest
involved.
The 1962 absentee ballot amendment1 36 which provides for
absentee ballots for persons serving the federal government and
their dependents and for full-time students, was attacked in
Hallahan v. Mittlebeeler. 13' The plaintiff had contended that the
act deprived persons not in the named groups of their right to
vote contra the Kentucky Constitution,138 and that the act was
134377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964).
',- Federal standards for interstate highways are required to be adopted as
a condition for federal subsidy.
13U Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 120.
137 373 S.V.2d 726 (Ky. 1963).
138 Ky. Const. §§ 1, 2, 3, 6 and 59.
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contra the constitutional provision for general registration of
voters in the state. 3" The court held that the constitution does
not require the legislature to provide for the other voters and
therefore they were not deprived of a right. The Kentucky Con-
stitution' 40 merely recites that the legislature "may " enact legisla-
tion for "other voters;" it does not mean that the legislature must
provide for all voters. There is no express provision prohibiting
the establishment of classes of absentee voters and the classifica-
tions chosen by the legislature were found to be reasonable.
In Cook v. Ward' the validity of an amendment' which
provides for allocation of funds "in accordance with the provisions
of KRS 177.860 (1)" was upheld in light of section 51 of the
Kentucky Constitution which provides that "no law shall be
revised, amended or the provisions thereof extended or conferred
by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revised,
amended, extended or conferred shall be re-enacted and pub-
lished at length." The court held that the purpose of the con-
stitutional provision was to avoid the situation which existed
when the legislature did not know what it was voting for, and
that amendment by reference to KRS sections does not pose this
problem because no legislator could be misled. The court quoted
from a report of the debates of the constitutional convention as
evidence of legislative intent:
The members of the General Assembly did not know what they
were voting on half the time and the section in the report
provides when an act is amended it shall not be amended in
that way, but the act, as amended, shall be set out in full, so
every man will understand what it is when voting on it, and
the people will know what change has been made when they
seeit.
143
The court also found the amendment not to be a re-enactment
of KRS 177.860 (1) but merely an incorporation of its provisions
into the amendment, and that the amended section was fully
published.
American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson
'39 Ky. Const. § 147.
140 Ibid.
141 381 S.W.2d 168 (Ky. 1964).
142 KRS 179.410.
'43 881 S.W.2d at 170.
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County Planning and Zoning Comm'n1 44 was the sole decision in
which a statute was held unconstitutional. The commission chal-
lenged the validity of a statute 1' which provided for a trial de
novo in circuit court from zoning commission rulings as an
unlawful attempt to delegate a legislative function to the courts
in violation of the Kentucky Constitution provision1 46 for separa-
tion of the branches of state government. The court sustained
this contention and declared this part of the statute invalid as a
substitution of the court for a legislatively-created commission.
However, the provision was found severable from the remainder
of the statute providing for appeals because the right to appeal in
certain situations'47 is an inherent right and could not be impaired
by the legislature. Two cases were expressly overruled. Louis-
ville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm'n v.
Gradyl4s and Boyd v. Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Comrmn 149 were in direct conflict wvith the principal case. The
court further indicated that it would follow the same path in ap-
peals from board of adjustment rulings under a similar statute.150
144 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).
145 KRS 100.057(2).
146 Ky. Const. § 27.
147 Where constitutional rights are involved, i.e., action by an agency in
excess of granted powers, lack of procedural due process, lack of substantial
evidence in support of a decision.
148 273 S.W.2d 563 (Ky. 1954).




During the 1963-1964 term, the Court of Appeals rendered
seven decisions which primarily sound in contract law. These
seven involve questions ranging from fraud in the sale of an oil
lease,151 interpretation of contractual intent,152 quantum meruit
recovery, 153 mutual releases, 54 mutuality of consideration, 5 the
parole evidence rule, 5 6 to an action for specific performance of
an option to purchase."'
Lappas v. Barker'5 8 is an unique case involving fraud in the
sale of an oil lease in Green county. This suit was instigated by
the seller of the lease to obtain satisfaction on a fifty thousand
dollar note given in part payment for a three-quarter interest in
the lease, and an additional one hundred thousand dollars having
been paid in cash. The defendant, a foreign investor who had
executed the note, pleads fraud in inducement and seeks recision
of the whole transaction. Defendant's two contact men in Green
County were men with whom he had previously entered in similar
joint enterprises. These two induced the defendant to buy the
said lease in a purported joint venture whereby they were to pay
fifty thousand dollars for a one-fourth interest. Unknown to the
defendant, these two men had a secret agreement with the plain-
tiff, seller, whereby their checks for twenty-five thousand each
were to be returned to them. The seller had told the men that
they could have all over one hundred and fifty thousand they
could get for the lease.
The Court of Appeals held that the defendant and the two
contact men had entered a joint enterprise to purchase and that a
fiduciary relationship was thereby created between the parties. 9
"As a general rule joint purchasers of property owe fiduciary
obligations to one another"1 60 and therefore the defendant had a
'51 Lappas v. Barker, 375 S.W.2d 248 (Ky. 1963).
152 Arnold v. Mitchell, 377 S.W.2d 799 (Ky. 1964).
'53 Jones v. Preston, 376 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1964).
154 Gibson v. Dupin, 377 S.W.2d 585 (Ky. 1964).
155 Cain v. white, 377 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. 1964).
156 Mario's Pizzeria, Inc. v. Federal Sign & Signal Corp. 379 S.W.2d 736
(Ky. 1964).
157Duo County Telephone Cooperative Corp. v. Reese, 379 S.W.2d 483 (Ky.
1964).
158 Lappas v. Barker, supra note 151.
159 Restatement, Torts § 874 (1934).
160 Lappas v. Barker, supra note 151 at 251.
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right to rely on the representations of these two men and the
fairness of the transaction. All parties to the sale except the
defendant knew these men were not in fact investing their own
money. This, plus the method of transacting the sale, i.e., passing
of three checks with two coming back under the table, together
with the general circumstances surrounding the relationship, con-
clusively showed that there existed here a misrepresentation
which constituted a material inducement for the defendant to
enter the contract to his detriment.
Fraud was thus clear, but the question of relief was somewhat
of a problem for the court since this was a suit by the seller against
the defendant not involving the two contact men. A return to
status quo appeared too difficult, and the court felt that the
seller should not bear the entire loss. To solve the dilemma they
granted the defendant recovery of excess payment against the
seller on grounds of aiding and abetting the fraud. This was
accomplished by reducing his note by a credit which made his
total outlay three-fourths of one hundred and fifty thousand
rather than of two hundred thousand dollars. Joint liability
based on aiding and abetting a fiduciary seems to be of first
impression in Kentucky.
Arnold v. Mitchell'6' involved two consolidated actions by a
real estate broker against the subdividers and the corporations
formed to develop certain subdivisions, for additional compensa-
tion due. The findings of the Fayette County Master Comniis-
sioner to whom the cases were referred were approved almost to
the letter by the Court of Appeals. One controversy arose out of
a written preliminary contract between the parties looking toward
formation of one of the defendant corporations. Both the contract
and the corporation were brought into existence at least primarily
to obtain capital gains treatment for the land-owning subdivider.
The contract contained the following:
It is further understood and agreed that after said corporation
has been formed and the land sold that an additional three
percent (3%) of the total gross sale price will be paid to the
party of the third part for his services rendered to the associa-
tion and/or corporation.162
161 Arnold v. Mitchell, supra note 152.
162 Id. at 800-801.
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Defendants insisted that there was no intention to be bound by
this contract of association since it was executed solely for tax
purposes. But the court said that the Master Commissioner's
finding of actual intent to pay was supported by the evidence
and not so clearly erroneous as would be necessary to overturn.
Defendant further asserted non-liability on the basis of a "null
and void" context, holding that the instrument when read as a
whole intended the obligations of the association to be transferred
to the corporation on formation, which formation was to end the
association as such.
Also noteworthy was an interpretation of the words "net
profit." In a contract of compensation the plaintiff was to receive
"twenty (20%) percent of the net profits after the costs of the
land and development have been made."163 The court held that
when these words were so qualified by expenses relating only to
direct costs, the intent was net profit before deductions of indirect
costs such as income taxes and the employing corporation
president's annual salary.
In Jones v. Preston'6 4 a subcontractor sought a quantum
meruit recovery for work done in excess of his bid to the principal
contractor. Two things worked to defeat the plaintiff's recovery
here: (1) the defendant lost money on the principal contract and
thus "no equities in favor of [plaintiff] ... such as would furnish
the basis for a quantum meruit recovery";165 (2) an oral contract
between the parties "to go ahead and get it done and... if he
made anything he would divide up .. ."11 clearly provided that
the principal contractor would not pay anything unless he made a
profit and this was not so indefinite as to warrant use of quantum
meruit recovery.
67
In Gibson v. Dupin68 the plaintiff, injured in an auto accident,
sues the driver of the other car, a minor, as well as his father, the
owner, on the basis of the family purpose doctrine. The defendant
pleads in bar a release signed by the plaintiff. To escape the
financial responsibility requirements and consequences of Ken-
163 Id. at 802.
164 Jones v. Preston, supra note 153.
165 Id. at 531.
166 Ibid.
167 See Simmons v. Atleberry, 310 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. 1958).
168 Gibson v. Dupin, supra note 154.
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tucky's motor vehicle laws, 16 9 plaintiff subsequent to the accident
had gone to the defendant's father and obtained his signature on
a release of liability. At the same time the plaintiff also signed
the following clause on the bottom of the same form:
I accept the foregoing release and acknowledge that I have
no claim of action for damages against the said McKinley
Dupin resulting from said accident.
70
The Court of Appeals in affirming the lower court's order
dismissing the complaint, held that this form so signed by both
parties did constitute a binding mutual release regardless of
plaintiff's ignorance of its import or his alleged intent not to
release.
171
To answer plaintiff's contention that the release at least should
not be effective against the son since his name did not appear
thereon, the court relied on the well settled doctrine that release
of one joint tort feasor is release of all as to that same cause of
action.
172
Apparently plaintiff's only hope against the son would have
been to have had the court say that it could be fairly interpreted
from the face of the release that plaintiff had reserved his rights
against the son.
173
Cain v. White174 was an action on a contract between two
former partners concerning the continued manufacture by one
partner of a partnership product for which patent rights had been
applied for. Defendant was to manufacture it and pay the
plaintiff a certain amount per unit. After two years of compliance,
the defendant refused to continue payment and asserted as a
defense to plaintiff's suit on the contract, lack of mutuality, i.e.,
no duties or obligations are imposed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's judgment by holding that there was
mutuality sufficient to support the contract even though the
defendant could cease manufacture of the product anytime and
169 KRS 187.330, .340(4).
170 Gibson v. Dupin, supra note 154 at 586.
171 Accord, Clark v. Brewer, 329 S.W.2d 384 (Ky. 1959); see Restatement,
Contracts § 70 (1932).
172 Kingins v. Hurt, 347 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1961); Restatement, Torts § 885
(1934).
173 Kingins v. Hurt, supra note 172, at 812.
174 Cain v. WVhite, supra note 155.
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thus terminate the agreement. But, if he did continue manu-
facturing, he must pay the plaintiff under the contract for his
interest in the product. The court here followed fairly well
settled principles of law concerning mutuality.
7 5
In Mario's Pizzeria, Inc. v. Federal Sign and Signal Corp.76
the plaintiff alleged that he was fraudulently induced to enter a
lease contract for a neon sign by the salesman's oral promise that
he could buy the sign for one dollar at the end of the lease period.
The signed contract provided specifically that the title was to
remain always in the defendant. Plaintiff had read the contract
before signing and protested but then allegedly acquiesced when
the salesman promised otherwise. The salesman denies the oral
promise. The plaintiff at trial level sought specific performance
of the oral contract or damages. Appeal was brought by the
plaintiff on a summary judgment for the defendant.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals said "it is our conclusion
that there was no genuine issue as to a material fact to be tried"'
because the parol evidence rule applies and prevents anything
coming in to contradict or vary the unambiguous terms of the
written lease. The case is in accord with general law.:"
Duo County Tel. Co-op. Corp. v. Reese'79 is an action for
179 Duo County Telephone Co-operative Corp. v. Reese, supra note 157.
specific performance of a right to purchase option sought to be
exercised by the lessee. Defendant, owner of the building who
had built to the lessee's specifications, insists on "$4,500 in addi-
tion to stipulated option price, . . . [for] cost of changes in and
additions to the specifications according to which the building
originally was to have been constructed."180 The Court of Appeals
reversed and held for the plaintiff on a finding that the de-
fendant's acceptance of advance rental payments without assert-
ing a claim for extra costs negated any construction of an implied
contract to pay.
175 Hambrick v. City of Ashland, 321 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1959); United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Cabell, 264 Ky. 135, 94 S.W.2d 320 (1936); Restate-
ment, Contracts § 372 (1932).
176 Mario's Pizzeria, Inc. v. Federal Sign and Signal Corp., supra note 156.
177 Id. at 740.
178 24 Am. Jur. Fraud and Deceit § 267 (1939).
180 Id. at 484,
VI. CORPOBATIONS
During the last term of the Court of Appeals, five decisions
were rendered involving principally corporation law. The two
most interesting are the well-written opinion by Judge Palmore
in Security Trust Co. v. Dabney's' which was a shareholder's
derivative suit attacking the controversial merger of the Security
Trust Co. and the First National Bank and Trust Co. of Lexington
and, A & W Equipment Co. v. Carro l 8 2 which was an unsuccess-
ful attempt by taxpayers in Bell County to defeat an allegedly
questionable contract between their fiscal court and the de-
fendant. The remaining three cases involved questions ranging
from acceptance of a contract by ratification,183 to a creditor's
attempt to "puncture the corporate veil"184 to an action by the
Attorney General, concerning a foreign corporation's failure to
qualify to do business in Kentucky.-8
Security Trust Co. v. Dabney8 6' was a shareholder's derivative
suit brought against the officers and directors of the Security
Trust Co. (hereinafter designated Security) and against the First
National Bank and Trust Co. (hereinafter designated First Na-
tional), with which Security proposed to merge. Plaintiff sought
to have the proposed consolidation declared illegal and sought
personal indemnity against the loss which would allegedly result
to some 12,000 shares of Security stock held by Security in various
fiduciary capacities. The trial court sustained the defendant's
motion to dismiss and the Court of Appeals affirmed by asserting
"where a plaintiff chooses to state his complaint in full detail,
... and neither its contents nor the inferences to be drawn from
them will support his claim for relief, a motion to dismiss . . .
should be sustained."
187
After holding that a shareholder could properly bring suit to
enjoin or rescind a merger contract, 88 the allegations of the com-
181 372 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1963).
3_8 77 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1964).
1,.3 Tarrants v. Henderson County Farm Bureau, 380 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1964).
184 Pike Motor Co. v. Adams, 380 S.W.2d 94 (Ky. 1964).
185 Commonwealth v. Monroe Co., 378 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1964).
180 372 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1963).
187 Id. at 407.
188 Botts & Co. v. Simpsonflle & Buck Creek Turnpike Rd. Co., 88 Ky. 54,
10 S.W. 134 (1888).
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plaint were categorized by the Court of Appeals into several parts
and so discussed. In the main these were as follows:
A. The transaction is tainted with self-interest because some
of the Security directors will make up the new consolidated board.
The court held that this alone was not a disqualifying self-
interest and, to the contrary, usually an indispensible arrange-
ment for both the old and the new corporations.
B. The transaction is a bad business deal for Security's
shareholders and trust accounts since: (1) Security's power and
prestige are dissipated through loss of identity and absorption by
a larger bank; (2) Security's shareholders will lose managerial
control since their 100% will be reduced to 40% in the new bank;
(3) the new stock will be worth less because the agreed value of
Security stock is too low on the basis of a bona fide offer to
purchase such stock, and the fact that First National included
$400,000 goodwill in its evaluation and Security none; and (4)
by virtue of consolidation, Security stock will become subject
to First National liabilities. To this complaint the court merely
reaffirmed the "business judgment" rule, which presupposes that
the directors were acting in good faith as reasonably prudent
business men, and on the basis of this refused to interfere with
the management, absent a show of fraud."8 9
C. The initial board of the new bank will be constituted by
contract thus depriving the shareholders of their statutory right
of cumulative voting. Here the court felt that the reasonable
necessity of such an arrangement far outweighed the temporary
technical suspension of voting rights.
D. The vote by the board of Security's own stock held in
trust by the bank should not have been counted, and if it had
not, the necessary two-thirds shareholders approval would not
have been achieved. On this point the court reiterated theii
holding advanced in the companion case of Graves v. Security
Trust Co., 90 permitting the vote count, in absence of a showing
of fraud or real and substantial self-interest.
In the language of the Court of Appeals, the A & W Equip-
ment Co. v. Carroll'91 case was initiated by "two interloping
189 Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Ky. 1951); Carter v. Louisville
By. Co., 238 Ky. 42, 36 S.W.2d 836 (1931).
190 369 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1963); 52 Ky. L.J. 695 (1964).
19' 377 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1964).
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volunteers, under the guise of public-spirited piety ..."192 suing
as taxpayers to invalidate a contract of sale between the defendant
and the Bell County fiscal court for two road graders. The con-
tract is attacked generally on the question of the capacity of the
parties. The facts were chronologically as follows: (1) The fiscal
court advertised for bids; (2) Only two were submitted, one for
$30,530 and defendant's for $38,286.50; (3) The higher of the
two was accepted on the grounds that it was the "best bid"; (4)
The defendant formed and filed incorporation papers; (5) A con-
tract was signed by one Dooly on behalf of the defendant
although he was not an officer of the corporation at the time;
(6) The contract was signed by the Bell County judge; (7) The
graders were delivered but not paid for; (8) This suit was filed
and the trial court issued an order restraining the fiscal court
from acting further under the contract; (9) The fiscal court
attempted to ratify the contract anyway; (10) A member of
the county budget commission was also an officer of the newly
formed defendant corporation. On these facts the Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and upheld the
contract on the theory of ratification by virtue of actual execution
by the defendant, i.e., delivery subsequent to incorporation.193
This case further points up the strong presumption in favor
of a county fiscal court by re-stating the accepted Kentucky rule
that the fiscal court is invested with broad discretion in con-
summating such purchases and that the courts should refrain from
interfering without a clear showing of fraud, arbitrariness or
capriciousness.9
The court here also defines for the first time a limitation on
KRS 61.190 by holding that its provisions "do not extend to an
appointive member of the county budget commission."195
Tarrants v. Henderson County Farm Bureau 96 was an action
by an architect for services rendered pursuant to an alleged
contract with the county farm bureau. In support of a directed
verdict in its favor by the trial court, defendant contends inter
102 Id. at 898.
193 See Catlettsburg & Buchannon Telephone Co. v. Bond, 262 Ky. 106, 89
S.W.2d 859 (1936).
'U4 See Ford v. County of Carlisle, 361 S.W.2d 757 (Ky. 1962); of. Taylor v.
Riney, 156 Ky. 393, 161 S.W. 203 (1913).
1'15 A & W Equipment Co. v. Carrol, supra note 191 at 899.
106 Tarrants v. Henderson County Farm Bureau, supra note 183.
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alia, that there was no contract since the bureau had abandoned
its building plans and because there was no formal resolution
by the board authorizing the work done by the plaintiff. In
granting a new trial the Court of Appeals followed the general
rule'9 7 and Kentucky case law,198 in holding that the corporation
could be bound by ratification, and where there is evidence of
acceptance of benefits and ratification there is a question for the
jury.
In Pike Motor Co. v. Adams'119 the two defendants, Pike Motor
Co. and its president, J. W. Tomlin appealed from a trial court
judgment which in effect punctured the corporate veil of the
debtor corporation, Tomlin Ford Co. Inc. and sought to hold at
least the defendant, J. W. Tomlin liable as the sole owner of
both corporations. No appellee's brief was filed and the court
accepted on the basis of RCA 1.260 the appellants statement of
the facts and issues. To these the Court of Appeals applied
KRS 271.215 (2) which provides that "a shareholder of a corpora-
tion shall not be held personally liable for any debt or liability
of the corporation", and then reversed in favor of the de-
fendants.200
Commonwealth v. Monroe Co.201 was an action by the Attor-
ney General to escheat property of a Delaware corporation and
for penalties for failure to comply with Kentucky's statutes per-
taining to the necessary qualification in order for a foreign
corporation to do business in the state.0 The court held that,
even if the primary purpose was to enforce the penalties, the
law was well settled, and where escheat is involved the Attorney
General cannot instigate the action. °3
197 13 Am. Jur. Corporations §§ 936, 1106 (1938).
198 Caflettsburg & Buchannon Telephone Co. v. Bond, supra note 193.
199 Pike Motor Co. v. Adams, supra note 184.
200 See Big Four Mills Ltd. v. Commercial Credit Co., 307 Ky. 612, 211
S.W.2d 831 (1948).
201 Commonwealth v. Monroe Co., supra note 185.202 KRS 271.055(3), .385(2), .990.
203 KRS 393.180; Commonwealth v. Grand Central Bldg. & Loan Ass'n Co.
97 Ky. 325, 30 S.W. 626 (1895).
VII. CRIMINAL LAW
A. RIGHT To COUNSEL
In Higbee v. Thomas, 2'4 the Supreme Court of the United
States sustained a writ of certiorari and the Court of Appeals
reconsidered the problem on remand of whether a habeas corpus
petitioner was entitled to a hearing on allegations of ineffective
counsel and a coerced plea of guilty. Petitioner alleged that
because counsel could spend only a few minutes with him before
the trial, he could not present an adequate defense. Assignment
of counsel was made on the day of the trial. The court reversed
itself and held that these allegations entitled him to a hearing.
The court appeared puzzled as to whether the Supreme Court's
"oblique" mandate would dictate a voiding of petitioner's convic-
tion if his allegations proved true, because of the dissimilarity in
the facts of the case 20 5 upon which the Supreme Court relied in
remanding Higbee.
The court held in Moore v. Commonwealth,'"0 that under rule
11.42 of the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter
referred to as RCr], °7 a hearing must be held to determine
whether the defendant was represented by counsel when he
pleaded guilty to a charge of storehouse breaking, resulting in
his conviction in 1936 as an habitual criminal.20 s The Moore case
presented the court with its first opportunity to rely upon the
1963 Supreme Court decision of Gideon v. Wainwright,20 which
offers powerful authority against denial of counsel in a state
felony proceeding. Its predecessor in Kentucky law was Gholson
v. Commonwealth.
2 10°
In Bradley v. Commonwealth," ' the appellant contended that
his constitutional rights were denied because the quarterly court
204 376 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1964).
2o5 Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 375 U.S. 13 (1963).
036 880 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1964).
20 7 Ky. R. Grim. P. § 11.42 [hereinafter cited as RCr] provides in part: "A
prisoner in custody under sentence who claims a right to be released on the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or statutes
of the Commonwealth or of the United States . . . may file a motion . . . to
vacate. . . . If an answer raises an issue of fact that cannot be determined from
the face of the record the court shall grant a prompt hearing...
208 IKS 431.190.
2003 72 U.S. 335 (1963).
210 308 Ky. 82, 212 SV.2d 537 (1948); see generally 40 Ky. L.J. 228
(1952).
211 380 S.W.2d 211 (Ky. 1964).
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judge did not inform him of his right to counsel, even though
the prosecuting attorney did so advise him. If it appears that the
accused knew of his right to counsel it is not necessary that the
court remind him . 12 The court further held that even if it were
assumed that the trial judge must in every misdemeanor case
advise the accused of his right to counsel [there is no Kentucky
authority for such a proposition] it must be shown that the
accused was prejudiced thereby when he subsequently had
counsel in the circuit court trial.
The amended RCr 8.08 [effective Jan. 1, 1965] states that the
examining court shall appoint counsel to represent the accused
in the preliminary proceeding if the crime of which the defendant
is charged is punishable by a fine of more than $500 or by
confinement for more than 12 months.213 This provision will offer
the accused assignment of counsel a step earlier than the stage
at which he is now assigned counsel-the arraignment.214 The
accused, in Maise v. Commonwealth,21' had no counsel in an
armed assault case when he was brought before the circuit court
on his arraignment to indictment. The Court of Appeals held
that since he was ably represented by counsel upon his trial his
constitutional rights were not denied because he had no counsel
on arraignment. Under amended RCr 8.08 an accused, unable
to obtain the benefit of counsel and not waiving the privilege,
shall have the benefit of counsel even before arraignment. If
this change had been in effect, the court would have had adequate
grounds for reversal.
B. INSANITY
In deciding Etherton v. Commonwealth,1 6 the court had
ample authority for holding that non-compliance with the statute
requiring a psychiatric examination did not void a conviction
under the Habitual Criminal Act.217 As to whether a person is
212 Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1048 (1949).
2 13 Amended RCr 3.08 (effective Jan. 1, 1965).
214 RCr 8.04: "If on arraignment or thereafter in felony cases, the defendant
appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel
and shall assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceedings
unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel.'
215 380 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1964).
216379 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1964).217 Mercer v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1961); Harrod v. Com-
monwealth, 311 Ky. 810, 226 S.W.2d 4 (1950); KRS 203.340 provides that when
(Continued on next page)
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properly fit to plead or defend himself in a criminal proceeding,
the court in Commonwealth v. Strickland25 set out the test for
determining whether the accused had the requisite mental state
to properly plead: ".... whether he had substantial capacity to
comprehend the nature and consequences of the proceeding
pending against him and to participate rationally in his de-
fense." 1 By an inquest Strickland was declared insane and sent
to a state hospital. Hospital authorities subsequently stated that
he suffered only from a personality disorder and could stand trial.
The defendant pleaded guilty, but by means of RCr 11.42 the
conviction was vacated by the circuit judge. The court has
upheld convictions of persons previously adjudged insane and
never formally restored, '22 ° but the case was reversed at the
instance of the Commonwealth because the trial judge did not
conduct a hearing on defendant's mental capacity to plead after
he had been adjudged of unsound mind.
Wide discretionary power has been allowed trial courts in
ordering formal sanity hearings pursuant to RCr 8.06.221 In
Hooper v. Commonwealth,22 the court held that failure to order
a formal sanity hearing when the appellant was returned from a
state hospital only a day before the trial was not an abuse of
discretion where the appellant only alleged that he was not ready
for trial. He did not specify grounds which would warant a
sanity hearing.
Wagner v. Commonwealth223 pointed out that it is well
established in Kentucky that the fact that an accused has pre-
viously been adjudged to be of unsound mind is not conclusive
of his sanity at the time of the commission of a subsequent
offense. In fact, not even a presumption of insanity was raised
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
a person is indicted as an habitual criminal, notice of the indictment shall be
given to the Commissioner of Mental Health who shall cause such person to be
examined by a psychiatrist.
218375 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1964).
219 Id. at 703; 14 Am. Jur. Criminal Law § 45 (1938).
2 20 Murrell v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 65, 163 S.W.2d (1962); Sharp v.
Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 765, 215 S.W.2d 983 (1948).
.21 Anderson v. Commonwealth, 353 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1962); Robinson v.
Common-wealth, 243 S.W.2d 673 (Ky. 1951); RCr 8.06 provides that if there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is insane, the proceedings shall
be postponed and the issue of sanity determined.
122 371 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1963).
23 379 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1964).
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in the Wagner case, since the last insanity judgment was entered
fifteen years before he was tried.
A voluntary manslaughter conviction was reversed in Brumley
V. Commonwealth, 2 4 because of the application of Terry v. Com-
monwealth,225 which changed the standard form of instruction on
insanity. The court held that the change in form of instruction
was prospective in application except in the instance of Terry and
those cases on appeal when the Terry appeal was decided. The
Brumley case was pending on appeal when Terry was decided.
C. BTRGLARY
An indictment for the possession of burglar tools with the
intention of using them burglariously was dismissed because it
involved vending machines outside of a building, and hence did
not fall under common law burglary.226 The state sought a certi-
fication of the law and the court held that KRS 433.120(2) in
using the language "tools for housebreaking, forcing doors, win-
dows, locks or buildings or other places" indicated a broader
intent than the common law burglary. The term other places
includes all buildings or places where goods, wares, merchandise,
or money is kept, including vending machines, instead of limiting
it to dwelling houses.
D. Tn.A.L PROCEDuRE
The following section deals with cases which have been
decided on procedural or technical points. It is a mixture of cases
which do not fit into any precise category, but must be dealt with
under the general heading of trial procedure. This section will
follow the sequence of events of pre-trial, trial, and post-trial
proceedings.
In Gill v. Commonwealth,22 7 the circuit judge failed to follow
the statutory procedure in selecting the grand jury. As a result
the indictment was set aside. The judge had ordered names to
be drawn from the drum during a special term on December 21,
1962. The order for the special term and the drawing apparently
224 375 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. 1964).
225 371 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963).
226 Commonwealth v. Marganon, 370 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1963).
227 374 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1964).
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took place on the same day. The indictment was returned on
January 15, 1963. The court set out the procedural steps which
should have been followed. KRS 29.135(1) provides, "at each
term of circuit court... the judge shall, in open court, draw from
the drum a sufficient number of names not to exceed sixty, to
procure twelve persons to act as grand jurors for the next term.
.. " The terms of the Pulaski Circuit Court were in October and
January for twenty-four days, so that a grand jury rendering an
indictment in January would have to be selected in October.
KRS 23.110(1) provides for a special term ".... by order of record
at the last preceding regular term . . ." or by posting a notice on
the courthouse door for ten days. Neither of these procedural
steps were observed.
In Woodford v. Commonwealth,2 - the defendant brought
error because defense counsel was required to examine jurors on
voir dire collectively, instead of individually. The court said there
was no error, because the examination of jurors is solely within
the discretion of the trial judge, subject to any abuse. To prove
the point, the court referred to RCr 9.38 which provides that the
court itself may take over the examination of jurors. Reasoning
from this, the court felt that where a trial court has this broad
power, it must certainly have the lesser discretionary power of
requiring collective examination.
Calhoun v. Commonwealth" provided the court an oppor-
tunity to discuss the effect of a change in one of the rules. The
defendant claimed error because the commonwealth's attorney
failed in opening the trial, to state to the jury the evidence upon
which he relied to support the charge. He claimed that he was
prejudicially surprised by the testimony of two prosecution wit-
nesses and the testimony of a third whose name was not on the
indictment. The new rules, RCr 9.42(1), abandoned the require-
ment that a failure to read the indictment and the defendant's
plea to the jury was reversible error. The old Criminal Code of
Practice, section 219, stated that the prosecutor may state to the
jury the nature of the charge against the defendant, but it was
changed to shall in RCr 9.42(1). The court said that here the
reading of the indictment was sufficient to apprise the jury of the
28 376 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1964).22: 378 S.V.2d 222 (Ky. 1964).
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charge. RCr 9.42(1) was intended only to preserve the necessity
of apprising the jury of the nature of the charge.
The court had two opportunities to insist upon the need to
show by affidavit the competency of testimony and prejudicial
effect upon defendant by absent witnesses. A continuance was
refused where the defendant found during the trial that two
subpoened witnesses were missing. 30 The defendant had failed
to file an affidavit showing the competency of the testimony they
would have given. The lower court ruling was upheld. Again the
court upheld the refusal of a continuance in Pennington v. Com-
monwealth.23' Here an eyewitness used at the examining trial
was later reported out of the state and unable to be subpoened
for the trial. The defendant failed to give an affidavit showing
that the absence was prejudicial to him.
The court dealt with several cases involving improper ques-
tioning of witnesses. Without previously introducing evidence to
lay a foundation, the prosecutor repeatedly asked a character
witness for the defendant, "Had you known" that the husband
lived with the defendant before they were married "would you
still say her moral reputation was good?"232 The trial judge
sustained the objection to the question, but the prosecutor
repeated it in the same line. The court strongly stated that it was
prejudicial error to preface an inquiry to a character witness with
"had you known," and cited Laine v. Commonwealth.233 The court
flatly stated that similar tactics employed in a subsequent trial
would result in a reversal. In a similar situation, the prosecutor,
in Woodford v. Commonwealth,34 repeatedly asked the defendant
whether he had been chased by police officers prior to the
accident. The defendant answered the first time in the negative.
No evidence was introduced to prove such a chase. The court
held this a reversible error, stating it was highly prejudicial to
inject a false issue into the case by repeated questioning.
In Shirley v. Commonwealth,235 the defendant attacked the
credibility of the chief prosecuting witness by asking if he had
23
0 Shirley v. Commonwealth, 378 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1964).
231 871 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1963).
232 Gill v. Commonwealth, supra, note 227.
233 287 Ky. 134, 151 S.W.2d 1055, 1057 (1941).
234 376 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1964).
235 378 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1964).
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not had intoxicants prior to being robbed. He answered no. He
was then asked whether he had been arrested about fifteen times
for public drunkenness. The objection was sustained and upheld
on appeal. The court said that CR 48.07 does not permit par-
ticular wrongful acts to be shown for impeachment, with the
exception of a felony conviction.3 6 A witness cannot be cross-
examined on a collateral matter irrelevant to the issue.
In Jordan v. Commonwealth,3 the court made this classic
statement, "We cannot have one set of laws for Kentucky attor-
neys and another for lawyers from other states who undertake
the risk of trying cases here without familiarizing themselves
with our laws and practice." 38 The circumstances were that
defendant's attorneys, who were from Cincinnati, Ohio, failed to
preserve errors for review by making timely objections. The
court stated that the motions for a new trial did not suffice to
preserve the errors.
In his closing argument to the jury, in Woodford v. Common-
wealth'239 defendant's counsel was not allowed to draw an in-
ference from the failure to administer an intoxication test, or
other evidence. The degree of defendant's intoxication was in
issue. The court stated that counsel may in his argument discuss
the facts proved, draw reasonable deductions, and attack the
credibility of witnesses, where it was based on the facts in
evidence.
In the case of Cooper v. Commonwealth,240 the defendant was
convicted of incest. The defendant raised the issue as to whether
the girl was actually his daughter, contending his wife, when
pregnant with the child, had told him it was the child of
another. The instruction read, "If the jury believe ... that the
defendant Eugene Cooper, . .. did carnally know Marie Cooper,
his daughter, knowing such relationship to exist, . . ." (Italics
added.) It was error to definitely state the girl was his daughter
because it eliminated the issue as to parentage.
The terns "reckless conduct" and "wanton indifference" are
used in instructions a countless number of times. The court feels
230See KRS 447.155 and RCr 13.04.
237 371 SAV.2d 632 (Ky. 1963).
238 Id. at 634.
239 376 SAV.2d 526 (Ky. 1964).
3 4874 S.W.2d 481 (Ky. 1964).
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that although there are cases on both sides the better practice is
to define key terms in the instructions. 41
Where thirteen jurors hear a case, one being an alternate, the
clerk should put all the names in a box and draw one name at
the close of the trial. That person is the alternate and will not
decide the case. In Gill v. Commonwealth,242 the clerk failed
to follow RCr 9.32 in reducing the jury to twelve. He pulled
twelve names out of the box instead of one.
If the jurors are lodged overnight outside of the county seat
in which the trial is being held, this alone is not reversible error.
243
There must be some showing that it was improper and prejudicial
to the defendant.
In a significant opinion, Jordan v. Commonwealth,24 the
court, in recommending probation for the defendant, let it be
known that it is more interested in rehabilitating defendants
than punishing them. The defendant was nineteen years of age,
had a good record, and the circumstances of the accident in
which a passenger was killed did not indicate that the defendant
had acted criminally. The trial court refused a request for
probation because of the protests of the injured and the family
of the deceased. The court stated that the state, not the injured
individual, is the real party in interest and the chief beneficiary
of the probation process.
In Jordan v. Commonwealth, 5 the commonwealth's attorney
subsequently associated himself with other attorneys in bringing
civil suits against the defendant. The court did not consider this
question on the merits, but did take the opportunity to speak
out against it. The court stated that the practice was improper





In Cook v. Commonwealth2 46 a conviction of rape was reversed
because hearsay evidence was erroneously admitted. A friend of
241Woodford v. Commonwealth, supra note 228.
242 374 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1964).
243 Pennington v. Commonwealth, supra note 231.
244 371 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1963).
245 Ibid.
246 379 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1964).
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the victim testified to statements made to him by the victim
about an hour after the alleged rape. The court held that evi-
dence of statements made by the victim after the rape were not
admissible unless the statements were part of the res gestae; or
were limited to the bare facts of the complaint. Details of the vic-
tim's later complaint to a third party are not allowed as substantive
evidence. In a previous appeal of this case 47 evidence of state-
ments made by the victim six hours after the rape was held
inadmissible for the same reason. The question involved in these
cases is not the time lapse before the statements, but is simply
whether the statements are part of the res gestae.
Goehring v. Commonwealth2 48 was concerned with evidence
of the defendant's reputation for truth and veracity. The rule is
that evidence affecting the defendant's credibility as a witness
must be directed to the time he testified and a reasonable period
before.2 40 In the Goehring case, the court said that the "reason-
able period before" should not be construed too strictly, since
often the defendant's bad reputation would simply be a result
of the charge against him. It held that nine months before the
trial was within a reasonable time in this case, even though it
was the day before the offense was committed to which the
evidence referred. The conviction of armed assault with intent
to rob therefore was affirmed.
In Walker v. Commonwealth, 2 10 the court held that a written
confession signed by the defendant was properly introduced as
evidence. The defendant did not claim a violation of the Anti-
Sweating Act, KRS 422.110, and the confession was made only
two hours after the commission of the offense. The only delay
complained of by the defendant was long after the confession.
It is obvious that this subsequent delay could not invalidate his
confession. The judgment was affirmed.
(b) Search and Seizure
A search warrant issued by a trial commissioner was held to
be invalid in Slone v. Commonwealth,51 even though the county
247 Cook v. Commonwealth, 851 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. 1962).
248 370 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. 1963).
249 Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 200 S.V.2d 459 (Ky. 1947).
250377 S.W.2d 91 (Ky. 1964).
21 377 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1964).
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judge had specifically authorized the commissioner to issue war-
rants, and had approved this warrant afterwards. The court said
that the trial commissioner had no authority beyond the trials to
which he is assigned, and issuance of a search warrant is not part
of a trial. He therefore cannot issue search warrants regardles
of the attempted delegation of this power by the county judge.
Evidence obtained under this invalid search warrant was con-
sequently inadmissible and the judgment was reversed.
In Scamahorne v. Commonwealth,252 the defendant was ar-
rested under an invalid warrant of arrest, and evidence obtained
by searching the defendant incidental to the arrest was therefore
inadmissible. The warrant of arrest was invalid because it was
based on an insufficient affidavit. An affidavit on which a warrant
of arrest or a search warrant can be issued must furnish probable
cause for the issuing officer to believe that the named person has
committed the named offense. It must further state when and
how the affiant has obtained his information. Prior to Henson v.
Commonwealth,2 3 an affidavit was sufficient if it stated simply
that the affiant knew the named party had committed the offense,
without stating how he knew. This type of affidavit was known
as an "ultimate fact" affidavit. However, in the Henson case the
court held that thereafter even an ultimate fact affidavit would
be insufficient unless it stated how and when the afflant obtained
his information. The purpose of these strict requirements is to
enable the defendant to bring an action against the afflant for
false swearing or malicious prosecution if the afflant is not telling
the truth.254 These requirements have been uniformly followed
by the Court of Appeals in dealing with affidavits.
In Tabor v. Commonwealth 55 the defendant had an auto-
mobile accident and was taken to a doctor, leaving his wrecked
car at the scene. The sheriff thereafter had the car hauled to a
garage, then searched it without a warrant. The court held,
inter alia, that the evidence found as the result of this search was
inadmissible since it was not made incidental to a lawful arrest.
Even had it been made incidental to a lawful arrest, however, it
252 376 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1964).
253 847 S.W.2d 546 (Ky. 1961).
254 Ibid.
255 380 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1964).
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still would be inadmissible since the search was not made in the
defendant's immediate presence. 56
Smith v. Commonwealth257 involved the unusual situation in
which the defendant was arrested after the search was made as an
incident to his arrest. However, the court held the evidence
admissible since the arrest was not a result of the search. The
officers had come to the house for the express purpose of arresting
the defendant and had made the search almost contemporaneous
ith the arrest, but actually a few minutes prior thereto.
An additional point brought out in the Smith case was that
the defendant could not complain of the search, even if it were
illegal, since he was not the owner of the house and was not in
exclusive occupancy of the section in which the evidence was
found. Almost the same factor was involved in Brown v. Com-
monwealth,25s where the defendant was driving a car of which
he was not the owner. The court said that he could not complain
of the search made of the car, even though he was convicted
solely on the basis of the evidence found in the car. The evidence
was admissible since it was obtained as a result of a search in-
cidental to the arrest of the defendant for a traffic violation.
These cases are consistent with the rule that a person cannot
complain of a search of another's property, even though it is
incidental to his own arrest.
259
2. Corroboration of an Accomplice
RCr 9.62 provides that a conviction cannot be obtained upon
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The usual test
for establishing whether there is sufficient corroboration is stated
to be made by eliminating all the evidence of the accomplice.
The court must then determine if there is any other evidence
which tends to connect the defendant with the crime 260 or enough
evidence to substantially connect the defendant with the crime.261
In Truglio v. Commonwealth26 2 it was held that evidence that the
2
6 Flanery v. Commonwealth, 324 S.V.2d 128 (Ky. 1959).
27 375 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1964).
258 378 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1964).
20 Combs v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1960).
2 G Williamis v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.2d 609 (Ky. 1934).
2 61 Tinsley v. Commonwealth, 273 S.W.2d 364 (Ky. 1954).
262 371 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1963).
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defendant was in the company of the two confessed robbers two
hours prior, and three hours subsequent, to the commission of the
offense was insufficient corroboration.
In Galloway v. Commonwealth2 3 it was also held that there
was insufficient corroboration of an accomplice. There the only
other evidence had shown in effect that the defendant might
have had in his possession at about the time of the robbery a
pistol similar to the one used in the robbery.
Richmond v. Commonwealth264 was an abortion case which
brought up a new question for the Kentucky court. This con-
cerned whether the victim's paramour, who helped her find an
abortionist, should be considered an accomplice. The majority
of the court held that he was an accomplice and reversed the
case because there was no corroboration of his testimony against
the abortionist. The dissenting opinion, by Judge Palmore, dis-
cusses the history and purpose of the rule for the corroboration
of an accomplice. He states that it was meant only to caution
the jury concerning an accomplice and was not binding at com-
mon law. Therefore he is in favor of relieving the rule of its
mandatory effect, and making it a precautionary admonition to
the jury.
It is interesting to note a peculiar result of this case. Since KRS
436.020 provides that the woman upon whom an abortion is
performed is not an accomplice of the abortionist, there is no
corroboration needed for her testimony. Therefore, if she survives
the abortion the abortionist can be convicted on her testimony
alone. However, if she does not survive, the abortionist cannot be
convicted on the testimony of her paramour without corrobora-
tion. This will often be impossible to do, due to the secret nature
of the acts. Therefore, it gives the abortionist a very good chance
of going free if the victim dies, but makes it almost impossible to
go free if the victim survives. This carries an awesome suggestion
to abortionists.
3. Intent
In a prosecution for larceny, evidence of drunkenness was
held not to be conclusive of a lack of intent, and the defendant
263 874 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1964).
264 870 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1963).
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is only entitled to an instruction on that defense. Since that
instruction was given in Hagel v. Commonwealth,26 5 the judgment
was affirmed.
In Watkins v. Commonwealth266 the defendant claimed that
he was not conscious of his acts due to a blow on the head and
therefore should have been entitled to an instruction on that
defense. The court held that unconsciousness at the time of the
offense is a defense, but no special instruction on it is required.
Before the jury could convict they had to find that the defendant
intended his acts, and if they believed he was unconscious they
could not find the necessary intent.
An inference of an intent to be seen in public was permitted
to satisfy the requirement of intent in a prosecution for indecent
exposure. In Hunt v. Commonwealth267 there was evidence of
several different occasions when the defendant stood naked by
his window, while in his home, and called attention to himself.
The court said that the evidence permitted a reasonable inference
that the defendant intended to be seen and thus affirmed the
conviction.
F. HABrruAL CnuNAL Acr
The instructions under the habitual criminal act must conform
to a rigid rule that the prior conviction be emphasized, and not
the act."6" The conviction must impress upon the defendant that
crime does not pay and that his actions must cease. It is not the
act, but the conviction which must be emphasized in the instruc-
tion, so that the jury understands the reason for life imprisonment
under the habitual criminal act.
G. HoMIcIDE INSTRUCTONS
In Lambert v. Commonwealth,269 the court was presented an
opportunity to examine and discuss KRS 435.022, which renders
obsolete Stanley's instruction classifying negligent homicide with-
in the crime of voluntary manslaughter.270 "Negligent voluntary
8Gr371 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1963).
266373 S.W.2d 614 (Ky. 1964).
267 378 S.W.2d 813 (Ky. 1964).6 White v. Commonwealth, 379 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1964).
3GO 77 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1964).
270 2 Stanley, Instructions to Juries in Kentucky § 182 (2d ed. 1957).
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manslaughter" was abolished and the words "wanton" and "reck-
less" are now used to describe involuntary manslaughter. In the
Lambert case the appellant killed a fellow-prisoner in jail after
having been attacked, and he was convicted of voluntary man-
slaughter. An instruction on involuntary manslaughter was not
given. An eyewitness testified that Lambert knocked down the
deceased and kicked and "stomped" him several times. The
court held that instructions should have been given on first and
second degree involuntary manslaughter on the basis of the
following contentions of the appellant: there was extreme ag-
gravation, appellant was suffering from the effects of alcohol,
and he was in a state of shock. The testimony of the eyewitness
and the manner in which Lambert killed the deceased left it
questionable as to whether the appellant deserved an instruction
on involuntary manslaughter, an unintentional crime. This case
will be relied upon heavily and will offer strong authority for an
involuntary manslaughter instruction when there is the slightest
doubt as to whether the killing is intentional.
The court relied upon Lambert in Hemphill v. Common-
wealth.271 The appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter
and the court reversed because the trial court was instructed on
the common law offense of voluntary manslaughter, rather than
involuntary manslaughter as set out in KRS 485.022. The ap-
pellant killed a police officer and a witness testified that the
appellant was grappling with the deceased.
The appellant was convicted of murder in Combs v. Com-
monwealth,2 and under the instructions given by the trial court,
the jury had no other choice. Murder was the only crime pre-
sented before the jury, even though the circumstances showed
that neither the appellant nor the deceased had ever borne ill will
toward each other. The instrument used was a bottle, quite
obviously an improvisation. The court held that if there is any
evidence that tends to show that the crime was of less magnitude
than murder, it is the duty of the court to give an instruction on
such other phases of the case. In the Combs case such evidence
271 379 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1964).
2723 78 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1964).
273 Id. at 628.
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waranted an instruction on involuntary manslaughter and the
case was reversed on that account.
In another murder prosecution, Stanley v. Commonwealth,7 4
the facts showed that the appellant and a friend were occupying
a motel room and both were drinking. The appellant shot the
deceased six times and the court by means of circumstantial
evidence, inconsistent with prior intent on the part of the
appellant to kill, determined that an instruction on voluntary
manslaughter should have been given. A supportable theory was
that under the influence of alcohol there was some sort of affray.
The court reiterated a well-settled rule in Kentucky law that if
there is any evidence from which a reasonable inference may be
drawn that the defendant in a homicide case is guilty of a lesser
crime than murder, then instructions should be given consistent
therewith.276
In Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 76 the trial court refused to
instruct pre-emptorily to find a verdict for the defendant in a
murder prosecution where he alleged self-defense. Purely cir-
cumstantial evidence was used to negate self-defense, as the
accused was the only eyewitness. The Kentucky rule is that even
though the defendant is the only eyewitness to a killing and he
makes out a case of self-defense, the trial court may refuse to
direct a verdict of acquittal where some of the physical facts
and other testimony contradict defendant's testimony and cast
doubt upon the truthfulness of itY
77
H. POST CoNVICTION REMEDY
The post conviction remedy phase of Kentucky law has
recently undergone a substantial change. The change has taken
place in proceedings in accordance with RCr 11.42, which has
recently been amended, effective January 1, 1965. The only
significant change incorporated in the amendment is that the
Commonwealth shall have only twenty days after the mailing of
the notice of the filing of the motion to the Attorney General to
274 380 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. 1964).
276 Id. at 72.
276 373 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1963).
277 Id. at 730.
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serve an answer on the movant. Prior to the amendment the
time limit had been thirty days.
Rice v. Davis278 broadened the scope of habeas corpus remedy
to include radical irregularity other than the lack of jurisdiction
of the person or the offense as grounds for relief. This change
brought Kentucky into conformity with the federal rule.27 9 Ayers
v. Davis,2 0 handed down on March 13, 1964, made RCr 11.42 the
exclusive remedy, where it applies, and incorporated the broad-
ened habeas corpus remedy of Rice within its scope. The Ayers
case held specifically that a habeas corpus proceeding was
properly dismissed in the absence of a showing of inadequacy of
remedy by motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence as
provided by RCr 11.42. A week after the Ayers decision six
dismissals of applications for writs of habeas corpus were affirmed
under the Ayers rule.281 There was a strong dissent to the de-
cisions in these six cases made by Judge Montgomery. 2  His
reasoning was that such holdings constituted a wrongful suspen-
sion of the writ of habeas corpus in violation of the United States
Constitution, Article 1, section IX, and of the Kentucky Con-
stitution, section 16. His very impassioned dissent included the
allegation that "nowhere is there any authority for depriving such
person of his sacred right (habeas corpus) by resort to some
other means first."
28
Higbee v. Thomas284 involves a petition for habeas corpus
which was instituted prior to the effective date of RCr 11.42. The
petitioner alleged that he had been denied effective counsel and
that he was induced by the sheriff to plead guilty without under-
standing the effect of such a plea. The writ was denied by the
circuit court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court of the United States remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals, for further consideration in the light of Pennsylvania
ex rel. Herman v. Cloudy.' 5
278 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1963).
279 148 F.2d 667 (D.C.Cir. 1945).
280 377 S.W.2d 154 (Kv. 1964).281 Warner v. Davis, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); Coles v. Thomas, 877
S.W.2d 157 (Ky. 1964); Jones v. Thomas, 377 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1964); Pryor v.
Thomas, 377 S.W.2d 156 (Ky. 1964); Brown v. Thomas, 377 S.W.2d 156 (Ky.
1964).
282 877 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1964).
283 377 S.W.2d 878, 880 (Ky. 1964).
284 376 S.W.2d 305 (Ky. 1963).
285850 U.S. 116 (1956).
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The Court of Appeals held on remand that Higbee's petition
was sufficient to entitle him to a hearing on the issues (1)
whether he was denied effective counsel, (2) whether he under-
stood the nature and consequences of his guilty plea, and (3)
whether he entered the plea voluntarily, free of inducements and
pressures. If the questions were decided in his favor the convic-
tion would be void. This case is similar to Rice in that both
decisions were based on radical irregularities which are now
considered to be sufficient grounds for proceedings under RCr
11.42. In the absence of sufficient grounds under RCr 11.42, the
writ of habeas corpus may be used.
In Moore v. Commonwealth,' 6 the Court of Appeals recog-
nized that the Supreme Court decision in Gideon v. Wainwright
287
made it imperative that the states appoint adequate counsel for
indigents in felony cases. This case firmly established the rule
that a denial of adequate counsel in a felony case is grounds for
a RCr 11.42 proceeding. It should also be noted that this case
stands for the proposition that Gideon v. Wainwright is to be
applied retroactively in Kentucky.
Nolan v. Thomas288 held that the mere fact that the petitioner's
attorney was the son-in-law of the commonwealth's prosecuting
witness was not such an exceptional circumstance as would
allow an RCr 11.42 proceeding under the "radical irregularity"
rule of the Rice case.
The following three cases gave the Court of Appeals ample
opportunity to expound on the sufficiency of newly discovered
evidence to sustain an attack under RCr 10.06.29 In Yates v.
Comnmonwealth,2 0 the court held that evidence that another had
orally admitted the killing for which a defendant was convicted
was not newly discovered evidence, or even evidence at all, since
it would not have been admissable at the trial because of the
hearsay evidence rule.
In Jennings v. Commonwealth"1 the court affirmed an order
overruling a motion to vacate sentence made under RCr 11.42.
286 380 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1964).
287 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
288370 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1963).
280 RCr 10.06 provides for a motion for a new trial on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence.
290 375 S.W.2d 271 (Ky. 1964).
201 380 S.W.2d 284 (Ky. 1964).
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The court held that in order to support a motion for a new trial
in a criminal prosecution, the newly discovered evidence must
show with reasonable certainty that it would have changed the
verdict, or would probably change the result if a new trial
were granted.
In Mullins v. Commonwealth,292 new evidence which con-
sisted of a sworn statement by the prosecuting witness that she
had perjured herself at the trial was held sufficient grounds for
reversal of the conviction. She had testified that defendants had
walked into a room and shot decedent while he was seated in his
chair, but in her sworn statement, she had admitted that the
decedent had risen and fired at the defendant, thus provoking
the incident.
The Court of Appeals has been very strict in granting new
trials as indicated by the Yates and Jennings decisions. However,
the court will not hesitate to grant a new trial where it appears
that there might be a miscarriage of justice if one were not
granted.
In Commonwealth v. Strickland,293 the Court of Appeals held
that in the absence of a hearing on defendant's mental capacity
to plead after he has been adjudged of unsound mind, the prisoner
in an RCr 11.42 proceeding would be entitled to relief. For this
relief he must show that at the time he entered his plea at his
trial he did not have sufficient mental competence to defend
himself. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order to
vacate judgment on the ground that defendant had not shown
his incompetence to defend himself, and remanded the case for
the necessary hearing.
One may conclude from these decisions that Kentucky law
in the field of post conviction remedies has undergone two major
changes. (1) RCr 11.42 has for all practical purposes superseded
habeas corpus in situations where either would be applicable.
(2) The scope of RCr 11.42 has been broadened to include
radical irregularities of proceedings at the trial as grounds for
relief.
292 375 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1964).
293 375 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1964).
VIII. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
During the past term the Court of Appeals decided seventeen
domestic relations cases. Of these, five were decisions worthy of
comment. In Louisville Trust Co. v. Saunders,94 the court held
that a person was not destitute for the purposes of KRS 405.080
where she had a substantial amount of unexpended capital and
elected to preserve it. This statute requires children of indigent
parents to support such parents when they are destitute of
subsistence. The parent in this case was the mother of an incom-
petent child, and she had sought to have the committee in
charge of that child to pay her a monthly support. The mother
had $16,841.10 in bonds and savings accounts and elected to
preserve this capital. In refusing the mother such support from
her son the court said, "The appellee cannot place herself in
necessitous circumstances simply by electing to preserve the
principal of her estate."2"
The statute had not been construed as to this point, so the
court did not base its opinion on a Kentucky case. The court
found a very similar Delaware case as authority for the above
principal.2
96
In Hall v. Hall,297 the court held that parental gifts received
by the husband from his parents should be considered as part
of the husband's estate for the purpose of determining alimony
in a divorce action. In this case almost the entire estate of the
husband resulted from parental gifts. This was the first time this
precise question had come before the court. The court cited a
number of cases which were analagous to the present case. In
Ahrens v. Ahren, 298 the court included a grandfather's gift
through inheritance in the husband's estate.
The court said the chancellor had misinterpreted Heustis v.
Heustis 99 at the trial court level when he ruled that the parental
gifts were not part of the husband's estate. That decision did not
and was never intended to exclude parental gifts from the hus-
band's estate. No other cases "were found with any implication
294 374 S.V.2d 510 (Ky. 1964).
295 Id. at 511.
2 96 State v. Weldin, 38 Del. 158, 189 A. 586 (1937).
297 380 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1964).
298 313 Ky. 55, 230 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1950).
299 364 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1963).
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of such exclusion. KRS 403.060 which provides for property
settlements in divorce suits does not exclude parental gifts from
the husband's estate when alimony is being determined.
In Fyffe v. Fyffe,00 the court determined two interesting
questions. It was held that a wife could bring suit for restoration
of property under KRS 403.060 (2) independent of a divorce
action if the property rights were not determined in the divorce
suit. In this case the wife aided the husband as tax commissioner
while the husband worked at another job. No mention was made
of a property settlement when the divorce was granted. The court
relied upon Coleman v. Hunt301 which said "Restoration, when
proper, may also be had in an independent action subsequent to
the divorce judgment." But the court was relying on dictum
since in that case the husband, who was seeking restoration of
property, was denied the property on the grounds that he refused
to prove he was entitled to what he was seeking. It is safe to
assert that the court did not alter their past decisions on this point.
The second point of interest in this case was that the court
awarded the wife the amount of money she had paid on her
husband's insurance policy where she was named beneficiary.
The payments were made out of her independent funds while
he was in a period of incompetency. The husband later changed
the beneficiary to persons other than the wife or their child. In
holding that she was entitled to restoration of the premiums, the
court cited as authority Schauberger v. Morels Adm'r,3 02 where
the court held, "In other words, the wife's interest in the policy
on the husband's life is divested by the judgment of divorce, and
this is true though the premiums thereon may have been paid
by the wife, but in the latter case she will be entitled to be
reimbursed out of the proceeds of the policy the amount of the
premiums paid thereon."
In Hinton v. Hinton,803 the court held that where a husband
charged his wife with lewd and lascivious conduct, and he was
unable to prove the charge, this was sufficient to support wife's
claim of cruel and inhuman treatment of wife by the husband.
The wife had filed for divorce and the husband counterclaimed
300 375 8.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1964).
301 258 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1953).
802 168 Ky. 368, 182 S.W. 198 (1916).
303 377 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1964).
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for divorce under KRS 403.020 (4) with a charge of lewd
and lascivious conduct. The lower court awarded the husband a
divorce and custody of the children while denying the wife any
alimony or maintenance. The Court of Appeals held the husband
failed to prove his charge, but the Court of Appeals was precluded
from reviewing the granting of the divorce to the husband by
KRS 21.060 (6). But the court said they could review the
refusal of alimony, maintenance and the custody of the children.
The court followed a very similar case on this point, Rayburn v.
Rayburn.3 ' The court cited Clay v. Clay305 which also held that
such unfounded charges by the husband amounted to cruel and
inhuman treatment sufficient to allow alimony as well as divorce.
The court also gave the mother custody of the children after
determining that no evidence had been submitted which showed
she was an unfit mother.
In McDowell v. McDowell,30 6 the court held that where a wife
is granted a divorce, the husband does not have to pay the wife
maintenance support for a daughter by a former marriage. In
this case the wife had a daughter by a prior marriage. The mar-
riage lasted only a short duration. The court approved the award
of alimony as a matter of right, but said that no legal duty rests
upon a foster parent to support a stepchild upon divorce of the
foster parent of the stepchild. The court distinguished Brummett
v. Commonwealth0 7 where the foster father completely took his
wife's son into his home and gave the son his name in assuming
the role of loco parentis. As authority for the proposition that a
foster father has no legal duty to support a stepchild, the court
cited a Georgia case, Rogers v. Rogers. 3 But the Rogers case is
not in point, since there the child involved was not the child of
either the husband or the wife and had not been legally adopted.
304 300 Ky. 209, 187 S.W.2d 204 (1945).
305 334 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1960).
306 378 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1964).
307 357 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1962).
308 202 Ga. 329, 43 S.E.2d 152 (1947).
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IX. ETHICS
In Ratterman v. Stapleton,309 the court clarified the Kentucky
law as to who has the power to disbar an attorney. In this case
the circuit court had disbarred an attorney for making "false and
malicious statements about a judge." The attorney appealed.
In holding that the Court of Appeals is the only court that has
such a power the court said ". . . [O]ne who is sole agency of
admission can be the only court that can disbar."
The holding in this case would seem to abolish old R.C.A.
8.580 which said that "nothing in these rules shall be construed
as limiting or altering the power of the circuit and other courts
of this state to discipline members of the Bar as that power at
present exists." It at least limits its application of punishment
for contempt.
The Court of Appeals derives its power to disbar from KRS
80.170 which allows the court to formulate its own rules.
309 371 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1963).
X. INSURANCE
This term the court heard five cases concerned with the field
of insurance. As one might expect, four of these grew out of
automobile accidents. The other case involved a rather unique
mining "accident". In three of the automobile cases the court
was involved with attempts by the insurer to escape liability on
policies because of breaches of the conditions of the policies by
the insured. The other automobile case was concerned with the
steps necessary to result in a cancellation of a policy by the
insurer.
In Weaver v. National Fid. Inc. Co.3 10 the court held that
where the insured vehicles were used twenty-two per cent of
the time on trips over the 150 mile limit of coverage specified in
the policy, this constituted "frequent" trips as set out in the
policy.
In this case the insured, Weaver, operated two trucks in his
business in Pulaski County. One truck was wrecked in Celina,
Ohio, a point more than 150 miles from Pulaski County, the place
of principal garaging. The insurance policy on the trucks con-
tained a rider providing that no "frequent or regular" trips of
more than 150 miles from the place of principal garaging would
be made.
During the four months the policy was in effect prior to the
accident, the facts showed the trucks to have been used in trips
of more than 150 miles twenty-two per cent of the time. While
no Kentucky cases had construed this question, the court found
ample support in decisions from other jurisdictions for their hold-
ing that this constituted "frequent" use within the meaning of
the policy.' Those cases, 312 cited by the insured as supporting
his claim, were distinguishable on their facts as falling sub-
stantially below the twenty-two per cent use in the instant case.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Martin,1 3 while affirming Kentucky
law on breach of a condition subsequent in a liability insurance
310377 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1963).
311 See e.g., Indiana Rolling Mill Baling Corp. v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 141 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ind. 1956), aft'd, 240 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1957);
Kindred v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 2d 463, 75 P.2d 69 (1938).
312 See e.g., Bruin v. Anderson, 73 S.D. 620, 47 N.W.2d 493 (1957), holding
that a truck engaged in trips beyond policy limits 10% of time was not enough to
relieve insurer of liability.
313 377 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1963).
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policy as a defense to an action under the policy, certainly pre-
sented a unique statement of facts. The insured in the case, one
Mullins, a policeman in Floyd County, was pursuing decedent
at the time of decedent's death. Mullins failed to report the
accident "because he had not come into collision with the auto-
mobile of the deceased but was 600 feet behind when it ran off
the road" and he"... therefore assumed no claim could arise."1
1 4
However, the complaint alleged that Mullins operated his auto-
mobile in such a negligent manner as to run it into the car being
driven by deceased, causing his death. One is pressed to under-
stand how two versions of an accident could be that far askew.
However, the point of law raised by the case is well settled
in Kentucky, and did not require the court to interpret these
conflicting facts. A condition in the policy stated that in the event
of claim or suit against the insured, the insured "shall immediately
forward to the company every demand, notice, summons, or other
process received." Mullins failed to notify the insurer, the
defendant, until more than sixty days after he was served with
the summons.
The court held that as a matter of law, this was a breach of a
condition subsequent to defendant's liability and in such a case
prejudice to the insurer is not germane. In so holding the court
re-affirmed past Kentucky decisions on this point315 and made no
change in accepted insurance law.
In United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wells,316 the court found
that the damage for which the insured was attempting to collect
was excluded from coverage by the exclusionary clause in the
policy. The clause excluded from coverage all property over
which the insured had physical control. The agreed statement of
facts showed that the car caught fire while an employee of the
insured was welding a tailpipe.
In Partin v. United Services Automobile Ass'n,31-7 the court was
faced with determining what constituted effective cancellation
of an auto liability policy. The insured's automobile had been
out of use for a period of time and he began correspondence
with his insurance company to effect a cancellation and later
314 Id. at 584.
315 See e.g., National Sur. Corp. v. Dotson, 270 F.2d 460 (6th Cir. 1959).
316 380 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1964).
317 379 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1964).
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renewal of the policy. During this period the auto was involved
in an accident. The critical exchange which the court had to
interpret involved a letter from the insurer to insured offering to
cancel the policy if so requested, and a reply by insured the
critical part of which follows: "If it is possible and permissible to
start my policy effective 1 November '58 1 would appreciate it."318
The court felt that in view of his use of the words "if possible and
permissible", and in light of the insurer's letter, this should not be
construed as an unequivocal request for cancellation, 319 but
rather was an offer to further negotiate.
The question of what is an "accident" within the terms of an
insurance policy was dealt with in The Travelers v. Humming
Bird Coal Co. 2' The case is important enough to warrant a brief
summary of the facts. Suit was brought by the insured, a strip
mining company, to recover under two policies of insurance after
settlement of the claim by the property owner against the insured.
In October, 1956, the insured began surface strip mining on a
mountain side in Leslie County. In the operation a large amount
of earth and debris was removed and pushed over the slope of
the mountain. Operations at the site ended in December, 1956.
During this period plaintiff held an insurance policy with de-
fendant covering accidents and hazards resulting in destruction
of property and loss thereto. Prior to December, 1956, the earth
mass on the slope of the mountain began to shift or move, "not
all at once but gradually and slowly until it reached the Melton
farm below overrunning Melton's water supply and damaging
him seriously." The exact time the damage occurred is not known.
Travelers denied liability, its chief defense being this was not
an accident within the meaning of the policy. The lower court
held for the insured and insurer appeals. The Court of Appeals
upheld the lower court saying, "The accident mentioned in the
policy need not be a blow but may be a process ...It is not
required to be sudden like an Alpine avalanche that upon a shout
roars down with an overwhelming rapidity. A glacier moves
slowly but inevitably. Where the accident is a process, how long
is then not significant whether it takes three houses, three weeks,
318 Id. at 742.319 A request for cancellation must be unequivocal. General Ace. Fire & Life
Assur. Corp. v. Lee, 165 Ky. 710, 178 S.W. 1025 (1915).
320 371 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. 1963).
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or months." The court also said... "It was unforeseen that the
earth removed from the shelf would not secure a firm foothold."3'
The court, after looking at numerous past cases formulated the
following definition of acident: "As related to the present case we
deduce the principle that any happening resulting in injury,
arising out of the operation of the insured's business, which is
undesigned and unintended and not foreseeable as the natural
and probable consequence of the initiating act, may be regarded
as an accident within the meaning of the policy."
322
321 Id. at 88.
322 Ibid.
XI. LABOR LAW
During the past term, the Court of Appeals handed down
three cases in the field of labor law. These involved fire depart-
ment employees, wage agreements in leasing operations and the
minimum wage in the hotel and restaurant industry.
KRS 95.500(8), which became effective in 1962, provides in
substance that the fire departments of second class cities be
divided into three platoons, each platoon to be on duty for
tventy-four hours and off-duty for the following forty-eight
hours. As most fire departments have employees who are engaged
only for maintenance work, the issue arose whether this on-duty,
off-duty provision applied to them. The court, in City of Cov-
ington v. Meyer;323 decided that an electrician employed by a
second class city could not, under KRS 95.500(8), be required to
work an eight hour day, five day week. Such employees were to
have the same on-off duty schedules as regular "line firemen."
The court arrived at its conclusion by an application of KRS
95.010(2) (c) in which the term "fire department" was defined
as including all officers, firemen, and clerical or maintenance
employees. This case was the first judicial interpretation of KRS
95.500(8).
In Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Baker,324 the court held union
members may not recover from a coal company on a wage agree-
ment when the agreement was between the union and a third
party where there was no evidence to establish a master-servant
relationship between the third party and defendant, and no evi-
dence of subterfuge. Evidence that the third party was a prior
foreman of defendant would not in itself establish subterfuge
and justify a verdict for the claimant.
The decision and process whereby the Commissioner of Labor
fixed a new minimum wage scale for women and minors in the
hotel and restaurant industry was contested in the last term of
the court. In Hotel & Restaurant Ass'n v. Commissioner,3 25 the
central issue was the commissioner's alleged failure to take into
consideration the cost of living index in formulating the increase.
The court held that failure to follow the cost of living index
323 876 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1964).
324 375 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1964).
32s 374 S.W.2d 501 (Ky. 1964).
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did not invalidate the new order because the cost of living index
was only one factor to be considered in establishing a fair livable
minimum wage.
Appellant also objected to the order on the theory that the
commissioner had made the order "mandatory" whereas KRS
337.250(3) only authorized him to issue a "directive" order. The
court decided that the above statute applies only to original
orders subjecting an industry to a minimum wage and since the
hotel and restaurant industry had already been subject to a
minimum wage, the new order was merely a revision that could
be declared mandatory under KRS 337.290 and 337.300.
The court also noted that while the new order did not take
tips into consideration, a wage scale based in part on tips might
not give workers in the industry who received few or no tips a
fair wage.
The court further asserted that the commission had reasonably
formulated a fair livable minimum wage on data properly con-
sidered which included minimum cost of living budgets of other
industrial workers.
The present case shows a change in the attitude of the court
toward the significance of the cost of living index. In a 1954
case,326 the court held that orders fixing a minimum wage were
not supported by substantial evidence where consideration of the
cost of living schedule was unrealistic. In the period of time
considered, from 1942 to 1949, the cost of living had increased
by only four percent, and the commissioner had ordered an aver-
age wage increase of eleven per cent. This was deemed to be an
unrealistic consideration of the cost of living scale. In Hotel &
Restaurant As'n v. Commissioner, over the time period con-
sidered, the cost of living had increased by twenty-five percent,
but the commissioner ordered wage increases of up to 150 per-
cent in some cases. Therefore, the court has clearly lessened the
importance of the cost of living index in minimum wage con-
siderations.
326 Middlekamp v. Willis, 267 S.W.2d 924 (Ky. 1964).
XII. PROCEDURE
The procedure cases decided during the last term of the Court
of Appeals may be roughly classified into four general categories:
(1) pre-trial procedure, (2) trial procedure, (3) post-trial pro-
cedure, and (4) appellate procedure.
A. PRE-mIAL POCEDmu
The cases decided in the last term dealing with pre-trial
procedure involved class actions, injunctions, summary judgments,
requests for admissions, and declaratory judgments.
1. Class Actions
In the case of Business Realty, Inc. v. Noah's Dove Lodge
#20,327 the court held that officers of two voluntary associations
could be added as party plaintiffs as representatives of the as-
sociations and their members. As such, they would be real
parties in interest and have the capacity to file suit on behalf
of the associations. To defendants' contention that the three
plaintiffs were improperly permitted to intervene, the court
replied that the three did not intervene, but were added as
plaintiffs, as representatives in a class action under CR 23.01. The
court noted that voluntary associations are not legal entities and
that in Kentucky, they cannot sue or be sued.328 Although CR
23.01 does afford some remedy, the court pointed out that
legislation is needed to rectify this "deplorable situation."329
2. Injunctions
Breathitt v. Warren County Election Com'rr 330 involved a
suit by Democratic candidates for an injunction against a county
election commission and one of its appointees. The plaintiffs
alleged that the provisions of KRS 116.070 were violated in the
appointment of a registered Democrat as a Republican judge
of the election for a voting place. The lower court denied relief
and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs
failed to allege or prove that the appointment would in any
327 375 S.W.2d 384 (Ky. 1963).
328 Nichols v. BardweI Lodge No. 179 I.O.O.F., 105 Ky. 168, 48 S.W.
426 (1898).
' See Clay, Kentucky Practice, CR 4.04(4) comment.
330 372 S.W.2d 793 (Ky. 1963).
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manner, adversely affect or injure them as candidates, citizens
or taxpayers. It is well-established in Kentucky that an injunc-
tion will not lie unless the defendant is doing or threatening an
act which will be injurious to the one seeking the injunctive
relief. 331 The rule is not changed by the fact that public acts or
officials are involved.332
3. Summary Judgment
In Philpot v. Stacy,333 the appellant sued the appellee, a phy-
sician, for alleged malpractice in failing to discover and remove
pieces of the appellants clothing imbeded in an abdominal
puncture wound, before suturing the wound. The trial court
entered summary judgment on the ground that the action was
barred by the statute of limitations. The appellant urged reversal
on three grounds: (1) the appellee fraudulently concealed the
appellant's condition to him, (2) the treatment by the appellee
was continuous, and (3) the statute did not begin to run until
the appellant discovered the cloth in the wound. In affirming
the summary judgment, the court held, with respect to the first
contention, that the appellant had not pleaded nor proved fraud.
Fraud must be pleaded and proved.334 With respect to the
second and third contentions, the court states that the time of
the injury itself is the controlling fact with respect to the statute
of limitations and that the appellant could only have been injured
when the operation was performed. The rule in Kentucky is that
a cause of action accrues when a party has the right and capacity
to sue, and his right of action is not suspended until he discovers
that he has a cause of action.335 The only exception that has
been made to this rule is in the case of an underground trespass.3 36
4. Requests for Admissions
In Smather v. May,337 the defendant made requests for admis-
sions of statements that plaintiff, the owner of a truck, and co-
331 Bd. of Trustees of Demossville Graded Common Schools Dist. v. Bd. of
Educ., 193 Ky. 502, 236 S.W. 1038 (1922).3 3 2 Tittle v. Boggle, 300 Ky. 668, 190 S.W.2d 26 (1945); Hethel v. Furste,
260 Ky. 844, 86 S.W.2d 1018 (1935).
333 371 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. 1963).
334 Curry v. Stewart, 301 Ky. 645, 192 S.W.2d 739 (1945); CR 9.02.
335 Carter v. Harlan Hosp. Assn, 265 Ky. 452, 97 S.W.2d 9 (1936); Com-
monwealth v. Sammons, 180 Ky. 403, 202 S.W. 885 (1918).
336 Falls Branch Coal Co. v. Proctor Coal Co., 203 Ky. 307, 262 S.W.300
(1924).
337 379 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1964).
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plaintiff, the driver of the truck, were negligent in colliding with
defendant's automobile at an intersection and that defendant had
sustained special damages. The Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiffs' failure to respond pursuant to CR 36.01 constituted
admissions of the statements. While negligence may be a matter
of both fact and law, failure to respond to a request by objection
or denial constitutes an admission of negligence.33 All matters
contained in the request for admissions are admitted if not
answered. 339 This case affirmed existing law. The court also held
that where appellees fail to file briefs, although given nine
extensions of time in which to do so, the appellant's statement of
facts and issues are accepted as correct. This was simply an
application of RCA 1.260(c) (1).
5. Declaratory Judgments
In Absher v. Illinois Cent. Ry.,340 the plaintiffs brought an
action seeking declaratory relief, alleging that the defendant
breached its obligations toward them to provide medical care,
services, treatment, and hospitalization. The appellee had estab-
lished a hospital department to provide such services to its
employees, including the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had submitted
to the hospital regulations under the agreement. The lower court
entered a summary judgment on the ground that the factual
issues were not material. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a declaratory judgment
because they did not exhaust remedies provided by the hospital
regulations. It is established in Kentucky that such procedures
must be followed before resort may be had to the courts.341 The
court stated that even if the plaintiffs had exhausted such rem-
edies, a summary judgment was appropriate, although it should
have been in the form of a declaration of rights, instead of in the
form of a dismissal. 342 This is contrary to Morris v. Morris,34 3 in
which the court refused to allow a dismissal to stand where a
declaration of rights was appropriate.
In Freeman v. Danville Tobacco Bd.,344 the court restated the
33S Lyons v. Sponcil, 843 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1961).
339O'Campo v. Hardisty, 262 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1958).
340 371 S.W.2d 950 (Ky. 1963).
341 Carmody v. Pennsylvania Co., 206 Ky. 219, 266 S.W. 1083 (1924).342 See Hedden v. Hedden, 312 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Ky. 1958).
343 258 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Ky. 1953).
344 880 S.W.2d 215 (Ky. 1964).
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settled rule that an actual controversy concerning a justiciable
issue is a condition precedent to an action under Kentucky's
Declaratory Judgment Act.3 45  The trial court's dismissal of
appellant's action for a declaratory judgment that certain board
regulations were unconstitutional was affirmed. The appellant
had no present legal interest in the matter in which he was
seeking a declaration. The court indicated that the test of a
party's legal interest is a criterion of the judicial prerogative in
declaratory judgment actions.
B. TmAL PRocEDURE
The cases decided during the last term involving trial pro-
cedure consisted of a motion for a directed verdict, arguments to
the jury and amending complaints.
1. Amendment of Complaint
In Totten v. Loventhal,346 an administrator brought an action
for wrongful death of his decedent. The decedent died December
10, 1958, from injuries received December 1, 1958. The appellant
was appointed administrator in September, 1959. The original
complaint was filed one year later, in September, 1960. In March,
1961, the appellant filed an amended complaint which was held
by the lower court to state a new cause of action in that it asked
for damages for pain and suffering, and as such, was barred by
the statute of limitations in KRS 413.140(1) (a). In affirming,
the court held that the original complaint stated a cause of
action under the wrongful death statute. 47 The personal repre-
sentative of the deceased may elect to sue for wrongful death or
for pain and suffering, but he cannot sue for both.3 48 Thus, an
amended complaint seeking damages for pain and suffering
states a new cause of action and does not relate back to the
original complaint.
2. Notice
In Wharton v. Cole,349 the trial court rendered a judgment
permanently enjoining the defendants from doing certain acts.
345KRS 418.040.
346 373 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1963).347KRS 411.130.
348 Cottengim's Adm'r v. Adam's Adm'x, 255 S.W.2d 637 (Ky. 1953).
349 374 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. 1964).
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The defendants had neither notice nor an opportunity to be
heard. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court com-
mitted reversible error. It is essential in a judicial proceeding
that notice of hearing be given to the adverse partyY °0 In Ken-
tucky, under CR 40, it is established that it is reversible error to
render a judgment where the defendant is not in default and has
no notice of the proceeding.
51
3. Challenges for Cause
In Brumfield v. Commonwealth,352 the court held that a de-
fendant was deprived of a fair trial because the trial court had
erred in failing to sustain his challenges to jurors, two of whom
had been impaneled to try him the previous day on a speeding
charge and several others of whom had been in the courtroom
during the course of the trial. A defendant in a criminal case is
entitled to a jury composed of fair and impartial jurors who have
neither actual nor implied bias . 3" This decision is consistent with
past Kentucky decisions."-' The court also held that it was error
to require the defendant to use his peremptory challenges before
the Commonwealth had accepted the jury.Y
4. Argument to the Jury
In Pozitzer v. W. R. Martin Co.,356 the plaintiff appealed from
an adverse judgment in an action for negligence in the repair of
an ironer, in which the defendant had filed a counterclaim for
labor and materials. The court held that whether counsel should
be given an opportunity to argue a case orally in an action tried
without a jury is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge.
The court held that CR 43.02(5) permits counsel to argue as a
matter of right only in a jury trial. This construction of CR
48.02(5) is in line with the federal construction.3  It has been
held not to deny due process of law." 8
350 KRS 28.150.
351 Ledford v. Osborne, 850 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1961).
352 374 S.W.2d 499 (Ky. 1964).
353 RCr 9.36; Cross v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 537, 109 S.W.2d 1214 (1937).
354 Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 788, 202 S.W.2d 620 (1947).
355 RCr 9.36(1).
350 374 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. 1964).35 7 Peckham v. Family Loan Co., 262 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1959).





Ramey v. Ruth359 involved an action to recover for damages
arising out of an automobile collision. The court held that where
the record does not show the grounds upon which a party's
motion for a directed verdict is made, the ruling denying the
motion is not reviewable upon appeal.360 A motion for a directed
verdict must state the specific grounds on which the motion is
made . 6' The court also held that where a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is based upon the erroneous over-
ruling of a motion for a directed verdict in which the movant
failed to state his grounds, it is as if no such motion had in fact
been made. 62 The court further held that alleged misconduct
of counsel in closing argument is not reviewable upon appeal
where no objection was taken at the time.
36
6. Excusable Neglect
Two important procedural points are involved in Crowden v.
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. 364 First, the Court of Appeals held
that where a defendant only had an eighth grade education and
had no knowledge of court papers, the circuit court was correct
in denying his motion to set aside a default judgment on grounds
of excusable neglect. It is not an abuse of discretion to overrule
a motion to vacate a default judgment under such circum-
stances235 The decision in each case must rest upon the par-
ticular facts of that case. 66 Second, the court held that the
allegations of the complaint, when construed with the exhibits
filed therewith, adequately supported the judgment. This is con-
sistent with the rule that a pleading should not be construed
against the pleader; and that the court should not dismiss for
failure to state a claim for relief, unless it appears that the
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of circum-
stances which could be proved in support of his claim.
3 67
359 376 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. 1964).
360 Scott v. McLean County Bd. of Educ., 857 S.W.2d 312 (Ky. 1912).
361 CR 50.01.
362 Commonwealth v. Ragland Potter Co., 305 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1957).
863 Monongahela River Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Lancaster's Adm'r, 169
Ky. 24, 183 S.W. 258 (1916).
364 379 S.W.2d 236 (Ky. 1964).
365 Richardson v. Brunner, 327 S.W.2d 572 (Ky. 1959).
3667 Clay, Kentucky Practice, CR 60.02 (1963).
3 6 7 Ewell v. Central City, 340 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1960).
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C. POST-TMAL PROCEDME
Several cases were decided during this term of court dealing
with the time limit for filing a motion to set aside a judgment,
the execution of a judgment, the required notice for motion to
set a trial date, monetary amounts, and clerical errors.
1. Motion to Set Aside a judgment
Tarter v. Medley3 8 involved an action to quiet title wherein
judgment was rendered that the mother's daughter was the
legitimate child and heir of the alleged father. A motion to set
aside the judgment was filed more than a year later. The ground
for the motion was that the witnesses had committed perjury.
The motion was overruled and the movant appealed. The court
held that the motion was barred. A motion to set aside a judg-
ment on ground of perjury or falsified evidence must be made
within one year after judgment.3
Benson v. 1letr37 involved a proceeding on a prisoner's appli-
cation for a writ of mandamus to compel a circuit judge to rule on
his motion to vacate the judgment of conviction. The motion was
made pursuant to RCr 11.42. The court granted mandamus and
held that a motion under RCr 11.42 must be summarily over-
ruled if insufficient on its face as alleged to be by the respondent,
so that the petitioner would not be deprived of the right to test
its sufficiency on appeal.
2. Execution of ludgment
In Crady v. Bensinger,37' petitioner brought an original pro-
ceeding for a wvrit to prohibit the trial judge from entering an
order directing his re-arrest. The court held that where the trial
court entered judgment denying an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, but admitting the prisoner to bail pending
appeal, and a single judge of the Court of Appeals entered an
order setting aside that portion of the order admitting the prisoner
to bail, the order of the trial judge which in effect directed the
re-arrest of the prisoner while the appeal was pending, was
neither erroneous nor beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court.
3s8 371 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1963).
369 CR 60.02.
370 371 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1963).
371 370 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1963).
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Except where the appeal operates as a stay or supersedeas, the
lower court may proceed in executing the original judgment or
decree. If no supersedeas is issued, the successful party in circuit
court may have the judgment enforced.372 It is the duty of the
court, upon application of a real party in interest, to pursue as if
the appeal had not been taken.373 The court cited the rule gov-
erning civil judgments as authority for the execution of the judg-
ment in this criminal case.
3. Monetary Amounts
In Kayronz v. joiner,3 74 purchasers brought an action against
their vendors for specific performance of a land contract. The
vendors brought in the real estate broker as a third-party
defendant, seeking indemnity for whatever sum the plaintiffs
might recover. The lower court entered judgment denying relief
to the purchasers, but granting the broker's claim against the
vendors for his commission. The amount of the commission was
$760.00. The judgment recited that the amount in controversy
was over $2,500.00. In dismissing the appeal, the court held
that the amount in controversy would be over $2,500.00 if the
purchasers appealed, but only $760.00 for the purposes of an
appeal by the vendors. The failure to make a timely motion
for appeal in a case in which the amount in controversy is within
the monetary ranges mentioned in KRS 21.080 is fatal.31 5 Al-
though KRS 21.070 provides that a trial court may determine the
value in controversy and such is conclusive if the judgment does
not fix the value when construed with the pleadings, the trial
court may not create an absolute right of appeal by reciting a
value that has no basis when the judgment is construed in con-
nection with the pleadings.
37 6
4. Clerical Error
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Daly,377 appeals
were held to be untimely when not filed within thirty days from
372 Barrow v. Phelps, 238 S.W.2d 1016 (Ky. 1951).
3 73 Ex parte Hood, 107 Ala. 520, 18 So. 176 (1895).
374 377 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. 1964).375 See Pennyrile Rural Elee. Co-op. Corp. v. Lyon Co., 318 S.W.2d 430
(Ky. 1958).
376 Roth v. Stauble, 313 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. 1958).
377 374 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1964).
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the date that the county judge signed the order bookY.78 The
fact that the order book showed no date of signing did not affect
the time for appealing. The contention that the entry of the
date is as important as the signing itself and that there can be
no judgment until both are made is unfounded. Prior decisions
indicate that the act which makes the judgment effective is that
of signing the order book. Dating the entry is a matter of record
to be performed by the clerk. The court treated the absence of
a date as a mere clerical error subject to correction under the
provisions of CR 60.01. This opinion restates and clarifies
existing law. 9
5. Miscellaneous Cases
In the case of Commonwealth v. Johnson,3 0 the court held
that pursuant to RCA 1.260(c) (3), the failure of the appellee to
file a brief, where the appellant filed appropriate notice, is re-
garded as a confession of error requiring reversal without con-
sideration of the merits of the case. This restates existing law.
In Walker v. Bencine,38' the court held that a one-day notice
that a motion would be filed to set the case for trial was reason-
able where no substantial time for preparation was required to
resist the motion and there were no circumstances to prevent the
defendant's presence at the hearing. The court pointed out that
in Clay, CR 40, Comment 3, it is noted that a few minutes notice
would be sufficient in some circumstances. Since there was no
objection to the trial date as required by CR 40, the court held
that the defendant waived any objection to the reasonableness of
the notice of the motion to set the trial date. This restates and
clarifies existing law, since the 1960 amendment to CR 40
expressly requires that there be reasonable notice of the motion
to set a trial date.382
In Smarsh v. Spade,8 3 attachment had been made of the
defendant's property. His wife intervened claiming ownership.
378 KRS 177.087.
3Th Commonwealth v. Clarke, 340 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1960); City of Frankfort
v. Yount, 262 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1953).
380 376 S.W.2d 596 (Ky. 1984).
381374 S.W.2d 368 (Ky. 1963).
38 -Burns v. Brewster, 338 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1960).
383 376 SAV.2d 680 (Ky. 1964).
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The attachment was sustained. The appeal was dismissed, since
the amount in controversy was not shown to exceed $2,500.00." 4
D. APPELr AT P1RoCEuPE
The cases decided by the Court of Appeals during the last
term involving appellate procedure are best separated into two
categories: (1) those involving original proceedings in the Court
of Appeals, and (2) those involving appeals from lower court
decisions.
1. Original Proceedings
The Court of Appeals decided several cases in which the
petitioners failed to name the judge against whom an order for
mandamus was sought.
In Clevenger v. judge, Pike Circuit Court,8 5 it was held that
the failure to name the judge in a mandamus proceeding is fatal.
The court cited Trodglen v. Judge, Daviess Circuit Court,30
which stated that a proceeding to control the action of a trial
judge was in the nature of a personal action against him, and he
must be sued by name and receive notice.
In Burton v. judge, Owensboro Police Court,387 the court held
that the petitioner erroneously proceeded in an original proceed-
ing in the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus since CR 81
provides that the circuit courts have jurisdiction to provide relief
in mandamus proceedings directed against courts inferior to them.
This restates existing law.388
Farrow v. Downing80 was an original proceeding to compel
the trial court to permit the filing of an amended complaint in a
personal injury action to increase the amount of damages claimed
after the trial court had granted a new trial on the ground of an
excessive verdict. The court held that mandamus was not an
available remedy in the absence of a showing of an unusual
condition or circumstance, that mandamus would not control the
discretion of the trial court, and that an adequate remedy was
384 KRS 21.070 states that an appeal is subject to dismissal in the absence
of a showing that the amount in controversy is as much as $2500.00.
385 375 S.W.2d 277 (Ky. 1964).
386 371 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1963).
387 880 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 1964).
388 Hettich v. Colson, 366 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1963).
389 374 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1964).
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otheiise available. Mandamus is an original proceeding seeking
extraordinary relief, which is granted by the Court of Appeals
under unusual circumstances, where it is apparent that a great
injustice and irreparable injury will result to an applicant who
has no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise.3 90 But if there
is an adequate remedy, mandamus will not be granted, even if
the trial court abuses its discretion.3 91 Mandamus is a proper
remedy to compel an inferior court to adjudicate on a subject
within its jurisdiction where it neglects or refuses to do so, but it
will not ordinarily lie to correct a decision of the court. 92 In
Farrow v. Downing, the court held that petitioner had two
available remedies. If the trial court's ruling constitutes an
abuse of discretion, he will have an adequate remedy by appeal.
Under CR 15.02, if the proof establishes grounds for an award
of additional damages, the trial court could sustain a renewed
motion by petitioned since respondent's order was interlocutory.
In Hampton v. Judge, Jefferson Circuit Court, Chancery
Branch, Third Division,393 a petition was filed in the Court of
Appeals seeking a wvrit of mandamus to compel the respondent to
halt a proceeding to obtain consent for the adoption of petitioner's
child. The court held that there was an adequate remedy by
appeal and that petitioner failed to comply with procedural
rules in applying for the writ. It is established in Kentucky that
when an adequate remedy exists, the court will not grant
mandamus.394 The petition was also defective for the failure to
name the trial judge against whom the writ of mandamus was
sought. An original proceeding seeking the Court of Appeals to
control the action of a trial judge is in the nature of a personal
action against the trial judge and he must be named in the suit.
Three other cases decided this term are in accord.33 This is the
existing law in Kentucky. 6 The court also pointed out that under
RCA 1.420(a), in original proceedings, a petitioner must file a
390 Barker v. Breslin, 329 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1959).
301 Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.V.2d 799 (Ky. 1961).
392 Fannin v. Keck, 296 S.W.2d 226 (Ky. 1956).
393375 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1964).
394 Stewart x% Taustine, 343 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1961).
305 Long v. judge, Webster Circuit Court, 378 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1964);
Lairson v. Judge, Clark Circuit Court, 378 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1964); Trodgien v.
Judge, Daiess Circuit Court, 371 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1963).366 Conmmonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Circuit Court of Bulltt, 365
S.W.2d 106 (Ky. 1963).
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memorandum of authorities in support of his petition before he
is entitled to relief. 97
In Pryor v. Weddle,398 the petitioner requested a writ of
mandamus for copies of warrants, transcript of evidence, closing
arguments, instructions to the jury, judgment of his conviction
and copies of three indictments, claiming that he needed them
to support his allegations in pending litigation. He failed to
specify what the pending litigation was. The court held that the
petitibn was too vague to justify the granting of the relief sought.
A petition seeking mandamus to have a record furnished must
specify with particularity a ground or grounds in support of the
claim that some substantial right has been violated.399
In Brewster v. Bradley,400 the petitioner, held in the Lexing-
ton jail for extradition to Michigan, filed a habeas corpus petition
in the court presided over by respondent, to test the ex-tradition
order of the Governor. The respondent made no final ruling, but
indicated that he would deny relief to the petitioner. The
petitioner then filed an original action in the Court of Appeals
seeking to prohibit the respondent from complying with the
extradition order. The court, in holding that no appealable order
was before it, stated that the trial court would be justified in
staying the execution of the extradition order until the termina-
tion of the habeas corpus proceeding, including any order deny-
ing habeas corpus which might be appealed. Denial would be
the equivalent of compliance with the order. The appeal allow-
able in habeas corpus actions would be inadequate since there
are no statutory means of staying or superseding the trial sourt's
ruling denying habeas corpus, as there is where a judgment orders
the release of the person detained.40 '
2. Appeals from Lower Courts
In Dr. Pepper Botting Co. v. Ricks,02 the defendants appealed
from the adverse judgment in an action for damages resulting
from an automobile collision. In construing RCA 1.090, which
397 Curtis v. Bradley, 333 S.W.2d 944 (Ky. 1960).
398 380 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 1964).
S99 Oakes v. Gentry, 380 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1964); Newman v. Pound, 378
S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1964); RCr 12.54.
400379 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1964).
401 KRS 419.130(2).
402 376 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1964).
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provides that the appellee be named in the statement of appeal,
the court held that the designation by name of the appellee in
the statement in the caption of the appeal is sufficient. This is
the converse of a holding by the court that names appearing in
the statement but not in the caption are sufficient.403 The appellee
moved to dismiss the appeal since the appellants failed to move
for an appeal from a part of the judgment. In Garnett v. Hicks,
40 4
the court held that where the record does not show a motion for
appeal from such part of the judgment as was awarded to one
of the two appellees, the appeal from that judgment must be
dismissed. However, in the Ricks case, the court noted that the
Garnett case was a departure from the existing law stated in
Spartman v. Rowlett.43 It is believed that the rule in Spartman
is the better view since both claims stand and fall on the same
basis. The court also held that where a motion for summary
judgment has been denied on the ground that there exists a
genuine issue of a material fact, then such order is not only non-
appealable, but may not be reviewed for error on appeal from
the final judgment in the action.0
In Siler v. Williford,40 7 the court held that where an appellate
court decided a question of law concerning an instruction on the
evidence, the question decided is final upon retrial in which the
evidence is substantially the same. The opinion delivered on
the first appeal precludes reconsideration of the claimed error
upon a second appeal.40 8
413 Pelphrey v. Lemaster, 240 Ky. 759, 43 S.W.2d 29 (Ky. 1931).
401 333 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1963).
405 312 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1958).
4(16 See 7 Clay, Kentucky Practice 169, Comment 10 (1963); Bell v.
Harmon, 284 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1955).4 07 Siler .% Williford, 375 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. 1964).




A long standing rule in Kentucky is that, "words of exception
or reservation are words of grant and are ineffective to convey a
right or interest to a stranger to a deed."409 In Townsend v.
Cable,410 the court readily abandoned a rule it termed archaic
and technical. The deed causing the controversy contained a
clause which read: "There is reserved out of the foregoing tract
of land for the use and benefit soly (sic) of Jesse Townsend one
half interest of all the oil and gas to dispose of at his will."
The court held that under this clause Jesse Townsend
acquired title, so that a subsequent purchaser from Jesse Town-
send has a superior claim to this interest over heirs of the original
grantor. It recited three rules to be followed in the construction
of deeds: (1) "To determine the intention of the grantor as
gathered from the four comers of the instrument;" 411 (2) disre-
gard technicalities where the intention is clear;4u (3) "substance
rather than form controls." 413 It follows, therefore, where there
is a clear intention to create an interest or right in land, expres-
sions of reservation rather than grant will not per se defeat such
an intention. This rule has been approved and followed in Blair
v. City of Pikeville.414
In Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Campbell, 415 the court followed
precedent and held the lessee could as a matter of right strip and
auger, and he is not liable for damage done to the surface by
strip and auger mining unless it is done "oppressively, arbitrarily,
wantonly or maliciously." 416 Here the plaintiff failed to meet this
test. The court noted, however, that the cutting of a certain road
"might possibly" sustain a judgment and verdict under this rule.
But the claim was for damages to the entire tract, and no attempt
was made to assign specific damages to the road. For this reason
409 See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1199 (1963); Washum v. Konrad, 275
S.W.2d 427 (Ky. 1955); Sword v. Sword, 252 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1952); Flynn v.
Fike, 291 Ky. 316, 164 S.W.2d 470 (1942).
410 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1963).
411 Forrest v. Jones, 311 Ky. 830, 226 S.W.2d 10 (1950).
412 Long v. Madison Coal Corp., 125. F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Ky. 1954).
413 Wilkerson v. Young, 285 Ky. 94, 147 S.W.2d 53 (1941).
414 380 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1964).
415 371 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1963).
416 Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
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"there was no evidence ...on which the jury could make an
award for damages attributable to the road."417 This case clearly
illustrates the importance of itemizing damages.
Similar facts were before the court in Croley v. Round Moun-
tain Coal Co.41' The Blue Diamond case was followed in allowing
strip and auger mining as a matter of right under the lease. But
it was held that the portion of the complaint alleging operation
in an arbitrary, wanton and malicious manner stated a claim for
relief and should be tried.
About ten years ago oil and gas was discovered under the
Ohio River between the thread of the stream and the Indiana
shore. Essentially three classes of parties claimed rights to this
portion of the river: (1) the bordering counties; (2) those
claiming under patents of the river bed north of the thread of the
stream; and (8) the State Property and Building Commission.
In Commonwealth v. Henderson County,419 the court noted it had
previously determined that the northern bed of the Ohio River
is not patentable.40 This eliminated that class of parties claiming
under patents.
The only statute dealing specifically with the land in ques-
tion is the County Leasing Statute42 which provides:
All that portion of the bed of the Ohio River, lying north of
the thread of the stream, . . . is declared to be vacant ... land,
and the count, court of each county bordering on the Ohio
River may use or lease the river bed for county purposes....
Any contract of leasing by any such county court of such river
bed for any sand and gravel rights for or on behalf of the
county, conveys full right and title to the lessee....
This statute has never been expressly repealed, but it was argued
that it was impliedly repealed by the State Property and Build-
ings Commission Act. The court pointed out that this Act was
construed in Preston v. Clements '22 as involving only ministerial
responsibilities to determine and fill the building needs of the
state. The County Leasing Statute was held not repealed when
417 Blue Diamond Coal Co., Inc. v. Campbell, supra note 415, at 485.
418 874 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1964).
419 871 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1968).42 0 Ware v. Hager, 126 Ky. 324, 103 S.W. 288 (1907).
421 KRS 56.220.
422 813 Ky. 479, 282 S.W.2d 85 (1950).
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the court found no conflict between it and the Buildings Com-
mission Act. Since the County Leasing Statute was in force the
building commission had no power to lease the disputed property.
Having thus disposed of the claims of the patentees and the
building commission, the court held the counties had the power
to lease the northern portion of the Ohio River. It further held
that the mention of "sand and gravel" in the leasing statute did
not restrict the plenary power to lease. The court said that the
policy of the County Leasing Statute was to encourage develop-
ment of vacant land and that narrow statutory construction
would militate against this.
In another case, an oil and gas lessor's adjoining land was not
part of the leased premises. The lessor by oral agreement had
given the lessee temporary permission to use the adjoining land
as access to the leased tract. The lessee was to procure another
right of way within a reasonable time. The written agreement
made no reference to this oral agreement. In this case, Anderson
v. Britt,43 it was held that under these facts the lessee had no
implied right to use the adjoining property for access to the
leased premises.
In Hutchinson v. Schneeberger,42 the habendum clause in an
oil and gas lease formed the basis of the controversy. The lease
was fixed for a two year term, expiring on December 9, 1957,
unless oil and gas was then being produced. The lessee discovered
oil at a shallow depth during the primary term of the lease, but
desiring better production he elected to drill deeper. Being
unsuccessful at that depth, he then suspended all operations for
the winter, an accepted practice. The next spring he returned
and pumped oil from the shallow, first discovered level. The oil
was there, and all parties knew it was there.
Noting that this situation had not previously been presented
before it, the court held there was production under the provisions
of the lease. So the lease was automatically in force for as long
as there was production. The court relied on the Oklahoma case
of Western States Oil & Land Co. v. Helms 5 which held that
oil discovered during the primary term of a lease could be tempo-
423 375 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1963).
424 874 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1964).
425 143 Okla. 206, 288 P. 964 (1930).
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rarily abandoned to search for other oil, without a forfeiture of
the lease. The court also relied heavily on the lessee's display of
good faith in developing the lease with reasonable diligence.
B. WILLS AND TRUSTS
The case of Smith v. White420 involved the construction of a
residuary clause in a holographic will. The clause was held
ambiguous and void in its entirety. No new rule of law was
enunciated, but the case serves to illustrate the need for proper
execution of wills. Here the testatrix's intention seemed to have
been carried out, but even so it was the opinion of a court, not
necessarily that of the testatrix herself.
In another case the wife qualified as administratrix of her
husband's estate. In this capacity she sought to recover a loan
made from her to the husband before his death. In Combs v.
Combs427 the court disallowed such a claim for lack of proof of a
promise to repay and noted that in Kentucky a loan made to one's
spouse does not imply a promise to repay.428 This case shows a
spouse should have concrete evidence of a promise to repay; e.g.,
a note.
Two cases decided during the term concerned the appoint-
ment of administrators. Prior Kentucky law was followed in each
case. Skaggs v. Cook 9 involved the appointment of a public
administrator when a niece and nephew both qualified as execu-
tors. Because the niece and nephew were antagonistic to each
other, the county court appointed a public administrator and the
circuit court affirmed. On appeal the judgment was reversed,
and the niece, who would act to enhance deceased's estate, was
ordered appointed. It was noted that the antagonism necessary
to disqualify the niece must be such that it is incompatible with
the best interest of the estate. "'. . . [M]ere personal hostility
toward a distributee does not necessarily disqualify one to act as
personal representative of an estate."' 430
426 378 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1964).
427 880 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1964).
428 Bailey's Adm'r v. Hampton Grocery Co., 189 Ky. 261, 224 S.W. 1067
(1920).
429 874 S.V.2d 857 (Ky. 1964).




Whisler v. Allen131 was an action against an ancillary admin-
istrator to determine the validity of the appointment. The dece-
dent, an out of state resident, died from injuries sustained in an
automobile accident. The challenged administrator was ap-
pointed in the county where the accident occurred. Citing Jewel
Tea Co. v. Walker's Administrator,32 the court held ".... that a
claim for damages for death resulting from... an auto accident
was sufficient estate on which to grant administration."43 3
In another case, a very domineering father had exerted con-
siderable influence upon his daughters to execute certain trusts.
After his death the daughters sought to revoke the trusts because
they were allegedly executed by reason of undue influence by the
father. On some evidence of undue influence, the court in
Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co. v. Leake434 allowed revocation of
the trust. Relying on Brannin v. Shirley,43' the court held that
where a trust deprives a settlor of all his estate, only slight
testimony of undue influence is needed to set it aside.
C. MORTGAGES
In Wilder v. Boatright4 36 the court considered a question of
first impression concerning a second mortgage. The original
mortgagor of a house sold it and took a second mortgage from the
grantee, the grantee having assumed the original mortgage.
Subsequently, the house was reconveyed to the grantors, and
the second mortgage released. The house was again sold with the
first mortgage being assumed. These last grantees defaulted,
and the first mortgage was foreclosed. The original mortgagors
claim the surplus from the judicial sale under the second mort-
gage. The court held that the second mortgage merged with
the first on the reconveyance to the original mortgagors. For
this reason they had no claim to the surplus proceeds of the sale.
The well settled rule that forbearance to sue is a valid con-
sideration to support a promise was reiterated in Cooke v. Louis-
431 380 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1964).
432 290 Ky. 328, 161 S.W.2d 66 (1942).
433 Whisler v. Allen, supra note 431.
434 380 S.W.2d 264 (Ky. 1964).
4359 Ky. 450, 16 S.W. 94 (1891).
436 371 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1963).
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ville Trust Company.437 It was held that forbearance to demand
payment on a prior note is sufficient consideration to support
another note and a mortgage on the borrower's house. The court
cited Hall v. Fuller 38 and Forsythe v. Rexroat439 as authority.
D. TrrLE To INTANGiBLEs
Where bonds are purchased in the name of the purchaser and
a co-owner, the rule in Kentucky had been that without actual
delivery by the purchaser to the named co-owner, there had been
no gift to the latter, and he acquired no interest in them.4 0 This
rule was expressly overruled in Marcum v. Marcum.4 41 Here a
father purchased United States savings bonds in the joint names
of himself and either of two sons. Reasoning that it was a
question of third party beneficiary rights under a contract, and
not one of a gift, the court held the sons were co-owners at the
time of purchase. On the death of the father they became the
sole and absolute owners, notwithstanding the lack of actual
delivery. This decision brought Kentucky into accord with
Treasury Department Regulations4 2 and a vast number of cases
from other jurisdictions.
443
The court has approved and followed the Marcum decision
in the subsequent case of Hensley v. Ball.444 There, the purchaser
had bought stocks, bonds, notes and cashier checks issued in the
names of members of his family. Citing the Marcum case, the
court held that the named members of the family, rather than
decedents estate, had title to the instruments.
E. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
The significant aspect of Willett Lumber Co. v. Hall445 is the
construction of the pleadings. Only by construing the pleadings
437 380 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1964).
438 352 S.W.2d 559 (Ky. 1961).
430 234 Ky. 173, 27 Sv.W.2d 695 (1929).
440 Henderson's Adm'r v. Bewley, 264 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1953).
441 377 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1964).
442 Second Liberty Bond Act § 22, 31 U.S.C.A. § 757c (1917); Treas. Reg.
§ 315.61 (1917).
443See generaly Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 788 (1955); 37 A.L.R.2d 1221 (1954);
173 A.L.R. 550 (1948); 168 A.L.R. 241 (1946).
444 380 S.W.2d 279 (Ky. 1964).
441 875 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1964).
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liberally did the plaintiffs state a claim for which relief could
be granted. Citing Kentucky Civil Rules 8.06, 801 and 54.03, the
court reiterated its policy for liberal construction of pleadings.
44
In an action to set aside a deed as a fraudulent conveyance,
the rule of evidence governing admissions was extended in Trent
v. Carroll.447 The purchaser of the property was questioned con-
cerning his prior notice of the claim of the vendor's judgment
creditor. His evasive and unresponsive answers were held to be
a failure to deny, therefore constituting an admission.
F. QumTG Trrn_
Probably the most important case during the last term, involv-
ing an action to quiet tile, was Creech v. Jackson.448 It was im-
portant not for rules of property but because it enunciated a new
rule in appellate procedure. Plaintiffs sought to quiet title to
certain land and recover their proportionate share for timber
removed from the land. The court below dismissed their claim,
the separate claims being less than the jurisdictional amount
necessary to afford an appeal as a matter of right. Plaintiffs sought
to appeal on the basis that the aggregate of their claims exceeded
that amount. The defendants argued that such combining of
claims was not permissible to meet the jurisdictional amount
required, citing Roth v. Stauble449 where the rule was:
... that when two or more parties who might have brought
separate actions join in one suit to recover a money judgment
the aggregate sum does not determine jurisdiction of the court
... and (claims) cannot be united... for the purpose of giv-
ing this court jurisdiction .... 450
The court expressly overturned Roth adopting the rule as
stated in American Jurisprudence, Appeal and Errors, Section 56,
pages 885 and 886. The new test is ". . . whether two or more
persons . . . claim property or money under one common right
and the adverse party has no interest in its apportionment...
4 46 Ewell v. Central City, 340 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1960); Lee v. Stamper, 300
S.W.2d 251 (Ky. 1957).
447 380 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1964).
448 375 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1964).
449 313 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. 1957).450 Creech v. Jackson, supra note 448, at 680.
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between or among them." 1 If so claimed the interests may be
joined to confer appellate jurisdiction. Here the court found the
plaintiffs claims were within this new test.
In another action to quiet title 2 the court restated a rule
that in such an action the burden is on the plaintiff to establish his
title, and he may not rely on the weakness of his adversary's title.
On the same day in an ejectment action, 0 3 the rule was again
stated. The court held that in an ejectment action the plaintiff
cannot prove his own title by showing a defect in the defendant's
deed.
In another case to quiet title the plaintiff was the holder of an
unrecorded deed.454 The defendant claimed to be a bona fide
purchaser because the deed was outside the chain of title. The
plaintiff had given an oil and gas lease to the property which
mentioned the unrecorded deed; the defendant admitted knowl-
edge of this lease. The court held that since there was knowledge
of the lease, there was notice of the deed cited in the lease. Such
notice was held to have bound the defendant so he could not
claim as a bona fide purchaser.
G. REsnucrivE CoVEN Ns
Two cases involving restrictive covenants were decided during
the term. Neither changed existing law. In Dartmouth-Willow
Terrace, Inc. v. MacLean, the original developer had restricted
the lots in question for the benefit of the adjoining lots. But the
present owners of the adjacent lots executed quit claim deeds to
the appellee, releasing any right to enforce the restrictions. The
court held the restrictions were for the special benefit of the
adjoining lots and not part of a general scheme for the benefit of
the entire subdivision. The restrictions were no longer enforce-
able. moreover, these restrictions were against apartment houses,
and there had been many multiple dwellings built in the sub-
division. This change in conditions, the court found, also ex-
tinguished the restrictions to the extent they may have excluded
apartment houses.
451 Id. at 681.4
52 Kephart v. Rucker, 379 S.W.2d 244 (Ky. 1964).
453 Brumley v. Brumley, 379 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1964).
454 Turner v. McIntosh, 379 S.W.2d 470 (Ky. 1964).
455 371 S.V.2d 937 (Ky. 1963).
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The case of McMahan v. Hunsinger4 56 involved the interpreta-
tion of a restrictive covenant worded ". . . shall be used for
residential purposes only.. . ." Following the rule of McMurtry
v. Phillips Investment Co. 457 the court noted that draftsmen of
such covenants may use language expressly prohibiting the use
of property. But the failure to use such specific language war-
rants the view that it was a deliberate and intended omission.
The covenant as construed was held not to prohibit construction
of apartment houses.
H. INJURIY TO PROPRaTY
An easement in general terms had been reserved on certain
lots in favor of the city of Pikeville. The subsequent purchaser
of these lots sought damages allegedly sustained from construc-
tion of a sewer line through the lots in Blair v. City of Pikeville.48
Judgment for the defendants. On appeal the court reversed
holding: "If the sovereign extends its activities beyond the
acquired right of way to the damage of the abutting owner, it...
is taking (without compensation) within the purview of section
242 Ky. Constitution.4 9 The cause was remanded to determine
if the city used the easement in an unreasonable manner.
In an action to recover for damages to a house caused by
blasting operations there was strong expert testimony that the
blasting could not possibly have been the cause. Under such facts
in River Queen Coal Co. v. Mencer460 a directed verdict for the
defendant was not allowed; there was substantial evidence in
conflict with the expert testimony. In so holding the court
declared that to take such a view "would be requiring a com-
plainant to prove his case scientifically rather than by the law's
old established standard of probable cause."46'
A suit to enjoin operation of a rock quarry as a nuisance was
decided in Associated Contractors Stone Co. v. Pewee Valley Sani-
tarium and Hosp.41 It was held that since the test shot shook the
homes, it was certain that they would be repeatedly shaken by
456 375 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1964).
457 103 Ky. 308, 45 S.W. 96 (1898).
458 380 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1964).
459 Id. at 87.
460 379 S.W.2d 461 (Ky. 1964).
461 Id. at 464.
462 376 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1963).
[Vol. 53,
1965] COuRT OF APPEALs REviEW 649
the larger shots expected to be used in the regular quarrying
operations. The judgment enjoining the operation was affirmed.
In explaining the result the court pointed out some historical
developments in the law of nuisance. Under the early view a
person's right to unmolested enjoyment of his property was nearly
absolute. During the industrial revolution this changed, and for
a time industry could do no wrong. Today the policy is to achieve
a reasonable balance between the person's right to peaceful enjoy-
ment of his property and the needs of commerce.
XIV. TAXATION
Commonwealth v. Smith463 dealt primarily with the Commis-
sioner of Revenue's attempt to enforce inheritance tax liens
against certain real property in the hands of bona fide purchasers
for value from the deceased's estate. They were without actual
notice of the tax deficiency, the sale having taken place prior to
filing of the liens. In holding that the liens could be enforced,
the Court of Appeals followed Kentucky case law4" and in-
terpreted, so as to reconcile, two seemingly conflicting statutes.465
In examining KRS 140.190 the court concluded that it, with
"reasonable clarity, provides that there shall be a lien on the
property transferred which, as respects real estate shall be valid
."466 against such purchasers whether notice is filed or not.
This construction, as the court noted, is not unreasonable since
purchasers from estates should anticipate the existance of an
inheritance tax liability.
KRS 134.420, which is part of the general tax law, requires
filing of notice of tax liens for them to be good against a bona
fide purchaser without actual or constructive notice of such liens
on all property. The court in order to reconcile the two statutes
held that "with respect to inheritance taxes KRS 134.420 [should]
be considered to apply only to property other than the property
transferred;" 467 thus notice is not required.
A less complicated approach would seem to have been to find
that a purchase from the estate of a deceased person was in itself
constructive (inquiry) notice of any existing inheritance tax
liability and thus no conflict in the two statutes.
In Kentucky Tax Comm'n v. American Tobacco Co.,468 the
commission sought to apply an alternate taxing formula pursuant
to KRS 141.120(9) to the defendant corporation. The question-
able part of the formula provided that all receipts from sales to
licensed wholesalers in Kentucky should be allocated to Kentucky
despite the fact that the sales were chiefly negotiated in New
463 375 S.W.2d 386 (Ky. 1964).
464 City of Vanceburg v. Plummer, 275 Ky. 713, 122 S.W.2d 772 (1939);
Naylor v. Bd. of Educ., 216 Ky. 766, 288 S.W. 690 (1926).
465 KRS 134.420, 140.190.
466 Commonwealth v. Smith, supra note 463.
467 Ibid.
468 Kentucky Tax Comm'n v. American Tobacco Co., 370 S.W.2d 590 (Ky.
1963).
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York. The court rejected the formula after interpreting the
statute to require that if receipts from sales are used in any
formula, those receipts must be assigned to the place of chief
negotiation.
This case was brought under the above statute prior to its
amendment in 1962 which would now permit such a formula.
The statute as amended provides; "receipts from sale . . . shall
be assigned to this commonwealth if... chiefly negotiated ...
in this state, or if .. . derived from. .. property delivered into




There was much litigation but little change in existing law in
the area of torts during the past term.
In the case of Schweitzer v. Good,70 the court again inter-
preted KRS 189.470 (1) which provides:
No person shall operate a vehicle when it is so loaded, or
when there are in the front seat such number of persons,
exceeding three, as to obstruct the view of the operator to the
front or sides of the vehicle or as to interfere with the opera-
tor's control over the vehicle.
In Clark v. Finch's Adm'x, 471 there were six persons in the cab
of the plaintiff's truck. The court held that it was prejudicial
error for the trial judge to refuse to instruct the jury that the
plaintiff's duties included the duty not to have more than three
persons on the seat occupied by the driver so as to obstruct his
view to the front and sides of the vehicle or as to interfere with
his operation and control thereof. In Coy v. Hoover,472 the plain-
tiff was one of four persons who occupied the front seat of a car.
The defendants contended that the plaintiff, in so doing, was
contributorily negligent. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in
upholding the lower court's submission of the issue to the jury,
in effect held that a person is not contributorily negligent as a
matter of law for riding in an automobile which has over three
persons in the front seat. In the Good case, supra, there were
also four persons, one of whom was a three-year-old child, in the
front seat. There was no evidence that the presence of the fourth
person had any causal connection with the accident. The court
held that the trial court properly refused instruction under K1tS
189.470(1).
In Music v. Waddle,"' the plaintiff pedestrian was struck
while attempting to cross a city street between intersection. The
plaintiff saw the approaching car as he left the curb and, thinking
that he had plenty of time, did not look again. He was struck by
the defendant's car just before he reached the center of the
street. The court held that the plaintiff was contributorily negli-
470880 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1964).
471 254 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1953).
472 272 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1954).
473 880 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1964).
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gent as a matter of law and that his negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident. The court noted that the plaintiff, under
KRS 189.570(4) (a), was charged with the duty to yield the
right of way. The court stated:
Unless this provision is to be reduced to something less than
a statutory mandate, the necessity of keeping a reasonable
look-out for his own safety cannot end at the curb, but must
continue until he clears the street.... (Emphasis added)
In reaching this decision, the court overruled the cases of Wilder
v. Cadle,47 4 Murphy v. Homans,47"5 and Ramsey v. Sharpley.470
The "continuing duty" theory of due care was again expressed
in the case of Louisville & N. R.R. v. Dunn.477 There was evi-
dence that the plaintiff truck driver had stopped his truck some
fifteen or twenty feet from the nearest rail and looked to see
whether anything was coming. Upon seeing nothing for a dis-
tance of some 900 feet, the plaintiff proceeded to the railroad
crossing. He testified, and the court accepted it at face value,
that it took some 85 to 45 seconds to reach the tracks at which
time he was struck by a train. After making the first look, the
plaintiff did not again look in either direction and was oblivious
to the presence of the train until after the collision. In holding
the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law, the court
said:
[D] ue care required that he either continue his lookout or at
least look again during the interim.... [E] very person has a
continuing duty of caution for his own safety and this duty is
not discharged by a momentary caution that is prematurely
abandoned. (Emphasis added)
In Wilson v. Lehman,478 the plaintiff sought to recover for
administration of shock treatments, allegedly without her consent.
The court adopted the rule stated in 70 C.J.S. Physicians and
Surgeons Section 62:
In the absence of evidence showing that the patient was the
victim of false representations, his consent to treatment or to
474 227 Ky. 486, 13 S.W.2d 497 (1929).
47G 286 Ky. 191, 150 S.W.2d 14 (1941).
476 294 Ky. 286, 171 S.W.2d 427 (1943).
477380 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1964).
478379 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1964).
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an operation will be presumed from the fact that he volun-
tarily submitted to it.
The court found that since plaintiff voluntarily submitted to the
treatments there was a presumption of consent, and because
plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption the directed verdict for
the defendants was affirmed.
Lastly, the case of Frederick v. Collins,479 the court held an
employer liable for an intentional tort committed by an employee.
The act was unauthorized. This case is not significiant because
of the result; rather, its significance is derived from the fact that
the court used the test set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
AGENCY, section 245.480 The court noted a tendancy to extend the
employer's responsibility under modem theories of allocation of
the risk of the servants misbehavior. In adopting the principle
used in the second restatement, the court recognized that it
reflects a broader basis of liability than did Section 245 of the
first edition.48'
47 378 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1964).
4 80A master is subject to liability for the intended tortious harm by a servant
to the person or things of another by an act done in connection with the servant's
employment, although the act was unauthorized, if the act was not unexpectable
in view of the duties of the servant.
481 A master who authorizes a servant to perform acts which... are of such
nature that they are not uncommonly accompanied by the use of force is subject
to liability for a trespass to such persons or things caused by the servant's
unprivileged use of force exerted for the purpose of accomplishing a result within
the scope of employment.
XVI. SOCIAL SECURITY
One case of significance came before the court this term in
the area of social security. In Commonwealth, Division of Unem-
ployment Ins. v. Goheen,4s2 the court held that defendant, a West
Virginia contractor, had to pay Kentucky unemployment taxes
on workers on a project completed wholly within the state of
Kentucky even though the workers were West Virginia workers
as defined by the Act, and even though the defendant had paid
the tax on these same wages in West Virginia.
At hand was an interpretation of KRS 841.056. The court said
that the interpretation of the uniform statute (which Kentucky
has followed) clearly makes the location of the work the chief
criterion and in the instant case, all work was done in Kentucky.
The decision of the lower court in favor of the defendant,
based on a double taxation problem, did not impress the Court
of Appeals. "The case at bar is one where the employer pro-
ceeded at his own risk in making payments (to West Virginia) if
in fact he did so .. ." The court relied on a New York case 483
which reached a similar result under the uniform statute.
482 372 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1963).
483 In re Malia, 299 N.Y. 232, 86 N.E.2d 577 (1949).
XVII. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
In the Workmen's Compensation area, the court handed down
several interesting decisions which shall be considered within
two rather broad categories: medical cases and subsequent claim
fund.
A. MEDI cL CASES
A large number of cases that reach the Court of Appeals
contesting decisions of Workmen's Compensation Board concern
the question of whether the Board was justified in reaching its
conclusions under the evidence presented. The court in the past
term adhered to the traditional rule that where there is conflicting
medical testimony the Board's decision will be upheld, as the
claimant has the burden of persuasion.8 4
Even though this rule is well settled it was further explained
and extended in three cases during the past term. In Thompson
v. Mayflower Coal Co.,48 5 claimant contended he was totally dis-
abled by an accident which occurred in the course of employ-
ment. The Board found that the claimant was disabled due to a
non-occupational disease, osteoarthritis. There was conflicting
medical testimony, but a specialist in radiology testified that in
his opinion, claimant's arthritic condition was not sufficient to
account for the disability. The radiologist, among the medical
experts, was the most qualified in this field. Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the Board was justified in reaching its con-
clusion, reasoning that except in cases of extreme and obvious
contrast, medical testimony must not be weighed according to
the qualifications of the witness insofar as review of Board de-
cisions is concerned.
The court in this case also disregarded claimant's contention
that the Board should have called one or more disinterested
experts in the light of the conflicting medical evidence, because
this was discretionary with the Board, since an amendment to
KRS 342.315 in 1946 making this mandatory was repealed in 1948.
In Kelly Contracting Co. v. Robinson,8 6 where the deceased
484 Bays v. Indian Hills Country Club, 377 S.W.2d 86 (Ky. 1964); Roark v.
Alva Coal Corp., 371 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1964).
485 379 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1964).
486 377 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1964).
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died of a coronary occlusion while working for a road contractor,
the only medical witness testified that the occlusion could have
been caused by deceased's work. The court held that a mere
possibility was not sufficient. This case reaffirmed the recent
policy of the court to look with great suspicion on cases of heart
attacks alleged to have been caused by the employment.4 87 Also,
this decision seems contrary to cases which have held that the
Board's decision must stand unless there is a lack of material
evidence of a probative force to support the Board. 8 s
In Lee v. International Harvester Co.,4 9 the court held that a
Board is not bound to give an award to claimant where claim-
ant's medical evidence would support an award and where the
defendant does not come forward with some definite quantum of
rebutting evidence. This is in line with a great number of recent
cases which hold that the claimant bears the burden of proof
and the risk of persuading the Board in his favor.490 The present
case is significant because it expressly overruled Greathouse Co.
v. Yenowine 49 which had held that where a claimant presents
evidence which would support an award, the Board is bound to
find for the claimant unless the defendant comes forward with
rebutting evidence.
In Neagle v. State Highway Department,4 92 claimant sought
to receive compensation for chiropractor's fees in treating an
on-the-job injury. The court upheld the Board which had
disallowed the claim. Apparently this was a case of first impres-
sion in Kentucky workmen's compensation law. The court based
its decision on KRS 842.020 which provides for compensation for
medical expenses, and KRS 811.550(8) which specifically pro-
vides that the practice of medicine does not include the practice
of chiropractic.
487 Terr, v. Associated Stone Co., 334 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1960).
488 Jenkins v. Tube Turns, Inc. 321 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1960); Clear Fork Coal
Co. Gaylor, 286 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1956); Black Mountain Corp. v. Myers, 289 Ky.
49, 157 S.W.2d 488 (1941).
489 333 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1963).
490 Columbus Mining Co. v. Childers, 265 S.W.2d 443 (Ky. 1954). Bays v.
Indian Hills Country Club, supra note 5; Roark v .Alva Coal Corp., supra note 5.
401-302 Ky. 159, 193 S.W.2d 758 (1946).
492 371 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1963).
403 Green v. Rawlings, 290 Mich. 397, 287 N.W. 557 (1939); Shober v.
Industrial Comm'n, 92 Utah 399, 68 P.2d 756 (1937).
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In states which classify chiropractic as the practice of medi-
cine, allowance for such fees is granted in workmen's compensa-
tion cases.4 8 But in jurisdictions like Kentucky which do not
consider the practice of chiropractic the practice of medicine,
the opposite result is reached,494 as in the principal case.
In a case of first impression in Kentucky, Berry v. Owensboro
Ice Cream & Dairy Products,495 the court ruled that infectious
bronchial asthma is not an "ordinary disease" arising out of and
in the course of employment. Diseases which are ordinary are
not compensable.490
In Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Lindon,497 claimant
had injured his foot in the course of his employment. According
to the medical evidence his foot had physically healed but
claimant had a form of psychoneurosis hysteria whereby he was
in constant pain and unable to work. There was conflicting
medical evidence whether psychiatric treatment in the form of
sodium amytal interviews (which are not considered dangerous
or painful) would correct the condition. The court overruled
the Board's decision and found that the refusal to submit to the
treatment was unreasonable and therefore denied compensation
under KRS 842.035. This seems to be a novel issue in Kentucky
case law, but the situation is closely akin to the "refusal to
submit to operation cases" where the court has consistently sup-
ported the claimant in his refusal to submit.49 8 The court based
its decision on the fact that in the "operation cases" there was
some degree of physical suffering involved and stated that the
difference of expert opinion as to the possible success of the
treatment was not sufficient to support a refusal to take the
treatment where it would involve no suffering. This is in conflict
with the theory in the latest operation case. Bethlehem Mines
Corp. v. HalW49 9 (decided last term), which expressly held that
if there is a difference of expert opinion concerning the danger
or result of a major operation, even though the great weight of
494 Corsten v. State Industrial Comm'n, 207 Wis. 147, 240 N.W. 834 (1932).
495 376 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1964).
496 KRS 342.316.
497 380 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1964).
498 United States Coal & Coke Co. v. Lloyds, 315 Ky. 105, 213 S.W.2d 47
(1947).
499 379 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1964).
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medical evidence indicates the operation is advisable, a Board
cannot be overruled in its finding that the employee's refusal to
submit is not unreasonable as a matter of fact.
In Inland Steel Co. v. Mosby,10 the court approved an award
to claimant of one hundred per cent disability for silicosis without
deducting an award for fifty per cent disability to the body as a
whole arising out of a leg injury incurred during the same period
of employment during which the silicosis was incurred. The court
quoted the statement that "The fact that a man has once received
compensation for fifty per cent of total disability does not mean
that ever after he is in the eyes of compensation law but half a
man... ."501 This case followed prior law.502
In Brock v. International Harvester Co.,503 Stevens Elkhorn
Coal Co. v. Tibbs, °4 Alva Coal Corp. v. Trosper,05 and American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Gerth,50 the court held
that an employee who is employed full-time by his employer is
not considered to be disabled while he is so employed. This is of
importance because of the statute of limitations for filing notice
of a claim. KRS 432.316(2) provides that "... notice of the claim
shall be given to the employer as soon as practicable after the
employee first experiences a distinct manifestation of an occupa-
tional disease in the form of symptoms reasonably suffcient to
apprise him that he has contracted such disease, or a diagnosis
of such disease is first communicated to him, whichever shall first
occur." In 1961 Mary Helen Coal Corp. v. Chitwood,50 7 inter-
pretated this statute to mean notice of actual disability, not
symptoms of an occupational disease. The above four cases along
with two 1963 cases50 are a drastic extension of this questionable
interpretation of the statute. It may well be that the law is by no
means settled on this point.
MUo 375 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1964).
GoI Id. at 269, quoting from 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 67.
002 International Harvester Co. v. Poff, 381 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1959).
503 374 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1964).
GN 374 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1964)
G0 375 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1964).
506 375 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1964).
507 351 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1961).
60S Inland Steel Co. v. Mullins, 367 S.W.2d 250 (Ky. 1963); Bethlehem
Mines Corp. v. Davis, 368 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1963). These two cases are con-




B. SUBSEQUET CLAim FuND
In Nashville Coal, Inc. v. Drake,509 claimant was injured while
working for defendant. The Board found that the injury to
claimant while working for defendant resulted in a twenty per
cent permanent disability and that a prior injury resulted in
claimant being eighty per cent permanently disabled. The Ken-
tucky statute in effect at the time of the injury, KRS 842.120(1),'5°
provided in substance that if the present injury combined with a
pre-existing permanent partial disability to produce a disability
greater than that of the present injury alone and exceeding the
total of the previous plus the present injury disabilities, the em-
ployer is liable only to the extent of the present injury and the
Subsequent Claim Fund is liable for the per cent of disability
over the total of the two accidents-due to a combination of
disabilities. Since in the present case the claimant was eighty per
cent disabled by the first accident and twenty per cent disabled
by the second, the court concluded he could not recover from
the Subsequent Claim Fund because there was no disability
over and beyond that directly attributable to a combination of
the first and second injuries. This case is a logical qualification
of the statute.
509 371 S.W.2d 859 (Ky. 1963).
510 This statute was amended in 1962, but KRS 341.120(3) now has sub-
stantially the same wording KRS 342.120(1) formerly had.


